Missouri Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 2 Spring 1996

Article 1

Spring 1996

Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower: The Legal Implications of
Evaluating Faculty Performance
John D. Copeland
John W. Murry Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John D. Copeland and John W. Murry Jr., Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower: The Legal Implications of
Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 MO. L. REV. (1996)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Copeland and Murry: Copeland: Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower:

MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW
VoLUME 61

SPRING 1996

NUMBER 2

Getting Tossed From the Ivory Tower: The
Legal Implications of Evaluating Faculty
Performance
John D. Copeland
John W. Murry, Jr. **

* Research Professor of Law and Director of National Center for Agricultural
Law Research and Information, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville;
B.A. 1971, University of Texas at Arlington; J.D. 1974, Southern Methodist University
School of Law; LL.M. 1986, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville;
Ed.D. candidate (Administration of Higher Education), University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville.
** Assistant Professor of Higher Education in the College of Education at the
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. He holds a B.S.B.A. degree in Finance 1977, an
M.B.A. degree 1982, a J.D. degree 1984, and an Ed.D. Degree in Higher Education
Administration 1993, all from the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Professor
Murry teaches graduate education courses in Legal Aspects of Higher Education and
School Law.
The authors thank Dr. James Hammons of the University of Arkansas Department
of Higher Education for his encouragement and invaluable assistance in preparing this
article.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................

........... 238

1.

........... 239

PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN GENERAL .....

A.

Formative and Summative Purposes ...... ........... 240

B.

Types of Evaluations .................

........... 240

C.

Categoriesof Evaluation ..............

........... 241

1. Research, Publications,and Scholarship ........... 241
2.

Teaching Effectiveness ............

...........

242

3.

Service .......................

...........

243

4.

Working Relationships ............

........... 244

D. Criteriaand Standards ...............
E.
II.

Objective and Subjective Measurements ....

........... 244
........... 245

THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL ROLE AS TO REVIEWING
EVALUATIONS ..........................

....... 245

A. Academic Freedom

....... 247

B.

Tenure ..............................

III. LEGAL CHALLENGES

A.

.....................

........................

Substantive Due Process ..................

....... 249
....... 252
.......

1. Pretenure and Substantive Due Process Claims ......

252

252

a.

Denial of Tenure and Property .......

.......

b.

Tenure as an Entitlement ...........

....... 254

c. Pretenure and Subjective Evaluations ... .......

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1

253

255

2

Copeland and Murry: Copeland: Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower:

199i6]

EVALUATING FACULTY PERFORMANCE
2.

3.

B.

a.

Immorality ............................

b.

Abusive Conduct ........................

c.

Insubordination, ContractBreaches, and Violations
of University Rules and Regulations .......

d.

Incompetence ..........................

e.

Academic Dishonesty .....................

Posttenure Review and FinancialExigency or Changes
in Academic Programs ....................

270

ProceduralDue Process .........................

272

Nontenured Faculty .........................

273

1.

2.
C.

Posttenure Review and "JustCause" .............

a.

De Facto Tenure ........................

274

b.

Liberty Interest .........................

275

Tenured Faculty ............................

Other Constitutionaland Statutory Challenges ..........

277
278

1.

FirstAmendment Claims (FreeSpeech) ............

278

2.

DiscriminationClaims .......................

291

a.

Title VII in General ......................
1.

2.

291

Disparate Treatment ..................

293

a. NondiscriminatoryReason Defense ......

294

b. Bona Fide OccupationalQualification
Defense ....................

298

DisparateImpact ....................

299

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
236

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

b.

[Vol. 61

Sections 1981 and 1983 Claims ..............

301

1.

Eleventh Amendment ..................

302

2.

Eleventh Amendment and Community
Colleges ..........................

304

RehabilitationAct of 1973 andAmericans
With DisabilitiesAct (ADA) .............

306

d.

Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967 ...

310

e.

Equal Pay Act ..........................

311

c.

IV. CONFIDENTIALITY .................................

V.

312

A.

Confidentiality in General ........................

312

B.

Piercingthe Veil of Confidentiality ..................

315

REDUCING LIABILITY EXPOSURE .......................

318

A. Developing a PerformanceEvaluationSystem ...........

318

B.

Clearly Stated Purposes ..........................

319

C.

Criteriaand Standards ..........................

319

D.

Use of Evaluators ..............................

321

E.

Documentation ................................

322

F.

Informing the Employee ..........................

322

G. Additional Considerationsin PerformanceEvaluations ....

323

1.

Contaminatedor DeficientAppraisals .............

323

2.

Halo Effect ...............................

324

3.

Recency Effect .............................

324

4.

Past RecordAnchoring .......................

324

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1

4

Copeland and Murry: Copeland: Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower:
1996]

EVALUATING FACULTY PERFORMANCE

H. ProceduralDue Process .........................

237
324

1.

Faculty Acceptance ..........................

325

2.

Simplicity ................................

325

3.

FairHearing ..............................

325

4.

Power ofAppeal Committee Clearly Delineated ......

325

5.

Exhaustion of Remedies ......................

326

SUMMARY .......................................... 326

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

INTRODUCTION

Faculty performance constitutes the lifeblood of any college or university,
for it is faculty who perform the important responsibilities of teaching,
research, scholarship, and public service. Because of the importance of
faculty to an institution, personnel decisions are critical, as retaining
incompetent faculty members can do immeasurable damage to an institution's
reputation and severely hinder its ability to accomplish its educational mission.
As a result, administrators have imitated private business in systematically
collecting data to assist in making personnel decisions. Performance
evaluations of faculty are now commonplace in educational institutions.,
Performance evaluations have become even more important in light of the
increasing financial problems facing higher education and calls for increased
accountability made by state legislators.2 Declining enrollments and budget
constraints place a greater premium on retaining and promoting only the best
academicians.
Obviously, faculty members have an equally important interest in the
evaluation process. Nontenured faculty members are year-to-year employees
and must be concerned about the nonrenewal of their contracts following a
poor evaluation. In most institutions, tenure track faculty members who do
not achieve tenure within a specified period of time are then given terminal
contracts for only one more year of service. Those who are thus "tossed from

1. William H. Holley and Hubert S. Feild, The Law andPerformanceEvaluation
in Education: A Review of Court Cases and Implicationsfor Use, 6 J. OF LAW AND
EDUC. 427 (1977).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-61-219 (Michie 1995). Annual faculty performance

review. (a) In order to promote a coordinated system of higher education in Arkansas
and to assure an orderly and effective development of each of the publicly supported
institutions of higher education, beginning with the 1990-91 academic year each statesupported college and university shall conduct a rigorous, consistently applied, annual

review of the performance of all full-time faculty members. The evaluation by
students shall be applicable to all teaching faculty, full-time, part-time and graduate
teaching assistants and shall include an assessment of the fluency in English of the
faculty member or graduate teaching assistant. This review shall include assessments
by peers, students, and administrators and shall be utilized to insure a consistently high
level of performance and serve in conjunction with other appropriate information as
a basis for decisions on promotion, salary increases, and job retention. This review
shall not be used to demote a tenured faculty member to a nontenured status.
(b)(1) The performance appraisal systems used by each institution shall be
approved by the State Board of Higher Education prior to implementation. (2) The
Department of Higher Education shall be responsible for monitoring the evaluation
process and shall report its findings to the State Board of Higher Education each
biennium.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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the ivory tower" are denied not only the prestige, security, and financial
benefits associated with tenure, but are also stigmatized as being "unworthy"
faculty members. As "tainted goods," their prospects of employment at other
institutions of higher learning may be very limited.
Given the widespread use of performance evaluations in education and
their impact upon careers, it should come as no surprise that the entire
evaluation process is filled with legal implications. In particular, the legality
of the criteria and procedures used in evaluating faculty performance have
been subjected to repeated legal challenges.
In addition, institutions of higher education are subject to an ever
growing web of federal legislation, especially in the area of discrimination.
This legal web can easily ensnare and entangle those colleges and universities
whose administrators fail to develop and follow legally sufficient evaluation
programs.
This Article examines some of the legal issues that permeate the
performance review process in higher education and offers some suggestions
for improving faculty evaluations. As will be apparent, the courts have
generally given institutions of higher education great latitude in devising and
However, colleges and
administering performance review programs.
universities do not have carte blanche with their performance reviews and
there are critical constraints on what institutions of higher education can do.
These constraints are rooted in principles of fundamental fairness and due
process, as well as constitutional and statutory requirements.
I. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN GENERAL
A performance evaluation is the process of gathering, reviewing, and
assessing information relative to the job performance of an employee? As
a result, performance evaluations serve three primary functions-informational,
developmental, and judgmental. Evaluations can facilitate communication and
understanding between administrators and faculty members. They can be used
to improve faculty effectiveness so that an individual's contributions are
maximized. A good performance evaluation can also assist in identifying a
faculty member's strengths and weaknesses, as well as future potential. And
finally, performance appraisals are used in making judgments about retention,
promotion, tenure, and salary increases.

3.

JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 6.07, at 6-150 (1984).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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A. Formative and Summative Purposes
Performance evaluations whose results are used to improve faculty
performance are formative evaluations.4 Although formative performance
evaluations are important to faculty development, their limited impact on
individual careers makes these types of evaluations less susceptible to legal
challenges. Performance evaluations used to make critical salary, retention,
promotion, and tenure decisions are known as summative evaluations.5
Summative evaluations are judgmental in character, rather than just
informative, and they give rise to the overwhelming majority of litigation as
related to personnel decisions.

B. Types of Evaluations
In conducting performance evaluations, institutions have four methods
from which to choose and will usually employ a combination of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

evaluations by supervisors;
assessment by peers;
self-evaluation; and,
6
student evaluations of instruction.

Of these, only self-evaluation is used primarily for formative purposes.
As a consequence, self-evaluations tend to be free of legal issues. 7
The other three forms of evaluation, however, are often used for both
formative and summative purposes. When used for summative purposes, a
supervisor's evaluation involves a faculty member being evaluated by an
administrator according to a prescribed set of criteria. Besides observations
of teaching techniques, the evaluation often includes a review of teaching
materials, scholarly research and publication, as well as institutional, public,
and professional service.'
Peer reviews involve rating an employee in accordance with much of the
same criteria as that found in supervisor evaluations. The difference is that
the evaluation is conducted by a faculty member's peers, who are believed to
be best equipped to evaluate a faculty member's performance.'

4. Holley and Feild, supra note 1, at 428.
5. Holley and Feild, supra note 1, at 428.
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-61-219, supra note 2, requires by way of example
assessments by (1) peers, (2) students, and (3) administrators.
7. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-153.
8. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-152.1.
9. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-152.1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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Student evaluations are based on the premise that students are in the best
position to judge teaching effectiveness and involve student assessment of
teaching methods. Although widely used for developmental purposes, student
evaluations tend to be somewhat controversial and faculty and administrators
resist them as the dominant means for assessing faculty performance for
retention or dismissal purposes.'0
Most faculty performance evaluation systems involve a combination of
the four types just described, with peer and supervisor reviews being
particularly important. However, student evaluations also factor into the
evaluation process and their results are often referred to by the courts in their
analysis of the legality of a particular performance evaluation system."
C. Categoriesof Evaluation
As previously stated, faculty members being considered for
reappointment, promotion, or tenure are traditionally evaluated as to research,
publications, and scholarship, teaching effectiveness, and public service. A
faculty member's working relationship with others is also considered by many
colleges and universities as part of the evaluation process.
1. Research, Publications, and Scholarship
Research, publications, and scholarship (hereinafter collectively referred
to as scholarship) is the most important category of evaluation at many
colleges and universities, especially doctoral granting institutions. 2 The
ongoing and often acrimonious debate over the importance of scholarship
versus teaching is beyond the scope of this Article. 3 But it seems quite clear
that the academic reward structure is still heavily weighted toward scholarship.
Colleges and universities weigh a variety of factors in evaluating faculty
scholarship. Publication in so-called "refereed" journals is often particularly
important in evaluations. Manuscripts in refereed journals have been
anonymously reviewed and accepted by scholars with specialized expertise in
a particular discipline. The reviewers are either members of the journal's
editorial review board or are selected on an ad hoc basis by the journal's
editor. 4

10. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-154.
11. See infra part I.C.2.
12. ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE
PROFESSORATE 28 (1990).
13. TERRY L. LEAP, TENURE, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE COURTS 70-74 (1993).
14. Id at 70 n.24 (critique of refereed journals).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Faculty evaluators also seem to place greater weight on journals that have
a scholarly, empirical, or quantitative focus than on those with a qualitative,
theoretical, or practical orientation. 5 Other relevant factors include the
overall quality of journals in which a faculty member has 6published and the
impact of a faculty member's scholarship on a discipline.'
2. Teaching Effectiveness
Although teaching effectiveness is often second in importance to
scholarship in retention, promotion, and tenure decisions, it remains an
important formal criterion for faculty advancement. 7 Teaching effectiveness
is generally determined by the observations and evaluations of one's peers and
students.
While teaching effectiveness is admittedly a difficult skill to evaluate and
is largely a measure of subjective judgment, a number of studies have
suggested certain characteristics indicative of effective teaching. A good
teacher should consider the rights and needs of students, contribute to student
intellectual growth, fairly evaluate student performances, command her
subject, clearly set forth course objectives, and effectively transmit the subject
matter. 8
Student evaluations do not carry as much weight in the faculty evaluation
process as supervisor or peer evaluations, but they can be decisive, especially
when combined with other performance deficiencies. In Agarwal v. Regents
of the University of Minnesota,9 a tenured associate professor's dismissal
was upheld by the court in large part because of student evaluations finding
him incompetent as a teacher and accusing him of frequently harassing
students. The student evaluations, combined with a past incident of plagiarism
and a poor working relationship with colleagues, were sufficient good cause
for the20 termination of the professor's employment despite his tenured
status.
In Conway v. Pacific University,21 poor student evaluations were the
primary reason for denying tenure to a professor. The professor had taken a
leave of absence from his tenure track teaching position at Central Oregon

15. Id at 74.
16. Id. at 77-78 (today citation analysis is often utilized to determine the impact
of scholarship).
17. Id at 82.
18. Id at 85.
19. 788 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 507-08.
21. 879 P.2d 201 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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Community College (COCC) to teach at Pacific University. During his year
at Pacific University he received poor student evaluations.'
While at Pacific, he applied for a permanent tenure track position in
Pacific's College of Arts and Sciences. Regardless of his poor student
evaluations, he was offered a position at Pacific. Before giving up his tenure
track position at COCC to accept Pacific's offer, he inquired as to whether his
poor student evaluations would affect his continued employment at Pacific or
impede his chances to obtain tenure. The dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences assured him that the student evaluations would not be a problem.'
Unfortunately, the professor's student evaluations did not improve during
his first year on the tenure track at Pacific. In fact, his evaluations
increasingly worsened. Based on those evaluations, the professor was only
24
offered a "terminal" or nonrenewable contract for the following year.
Based on the dean's previous assertions that poor student evaluations
would not be a problem, the professor sued the university for fraud. The
court held, however, that, in negotiating a contract with the professor, the
university had no special relationship with the professor that would give rise
to a duty to exercise due care regarding the representations it made."
3. Service
Faculty members are required to participate in university service,
professional service, and community service. Service is part of the formal
appraisal process but actually carries very little weight in personnel decisions
at most colleges and universities, especially when compared to the weight
given to scholarship and even teaching effectiveness.
Public service is given so little weight in personnel decisions that there
are no reported cases where a faculty member's public service deficiencies
were the sole basis for denial of reappointment, promotion, or tenure. Such
deficiencies have at times, however, been mentioned as a factor in denying a
faculty member advancement.26

22. Id. at 202.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 204; see also Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College Assn., 935 F.2d
974, 976 (8th Cir. 1991), where negative student evaluations were held to be a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory factor on which to evaluate tenure candidates.
26. See Ottaviani v. State University of New York at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365,
375 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1021 (1990). See, however, Roebuck v.
Drexel University, 852 F.2d 715 (3rd Cir. 1988) and Carpenter v. Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin System, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1395 (W.D.
Wis. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1984), where black faculty members
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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4. Working Relationships
The ability of a faculty member to get along with her colleagues can be
a factor in personnel decisions. Faculty members who chronically complain
or clash with other faculty members over professional or personal issues can
jeopardize their academic futures.27 Johnson v. Michigan State Universiv 8
involved a medical school's denial of tenure to a faculty member who
repeatedly complained about her office facilities and secretarial support.29
In addition, her colleagues described her as abrasive, intimidating,
authoritarian, and incapable of accepting criticism? Her personality resulted
in repeated clashes with students and colleagues. 3' The court upheld her
tenure denial.32
While lack of collegiality and inability to work with others can be a
legitimate basis for denial of promotion or tenure, it can also be a pretext for
illegal discrimination.33
D. Criteriaand Standards
Performance evaluations are based on criteria and standards. Criteria are
those things which an institution deems important and which must be fulfilled
if a faculty member is to be promoted or tenured (e.g., scholarly publications,
research grants, teaching innovations, university and public service).34
Standards for promotion and tenure are the degree to which such criteria must
be fulfilled (e.g., number of scholarly publications in refereed journals,
unsuccessfully claimed they were unable to do adequate levels of scholarship or be
effective teachers because of excessive public service demands placed on them.
27. LEAP, supra note 13, at 95.
28. 547 F. Supp. 429 (W.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 434.
30. Id. at 435.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 430.
33. The employment ofa female faculty member in the social sciences department
was terminated by Pace College on the grounds that she was "troublesome."
Admittedly, the faculty member's relationship with other faculty was not amicable.
But evidence established that lack of collegiality was not the real reason for her denial
of promotion from associate professor to professor and later denial of tenure. The
department head told the faculty member that he did not like women around because
he could not use "four-letter" words in their presence. He also contended that he could
not pay a woman as much as a man because it would demoralize the department. Pace
College v. Commission on Human Rights, 339 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1975). See also
infra III.C.2.a.-b.

34. LEAP, supra note 13, at 61, 169.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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amount received in research grants, types of teaching innovations, types of
university and public service)."
Criteria can be divided into two categories. The first is a faculty
member's personal accomplishments and characteristics, such as her research
and publications record, teaching effectiveness, collegiality, and service record.
The second category includes whether a faculty member meets institutional
needs as dictated by finances, departmental growth, or curricular needs. Of
the two categories, personal criteria is usually the dominant consideration in
determining reappointment, promotion, and tenure;36 it is because of the
dominance of this first group of criteria that faculty performance evaluations
are so critical.
E. Objective and Subjective Measurements
Criteria and standards involve objective and subjective measurements.
Objective measurements can be readily counted. The type of degrees held by
a faculty member, the number of published books and articles, committees
served on, and the number of service activities performed are all objective
measurements.37
Subjective measurements are subject to varying degrees of interpretation.
Members of peer review committees, department heads, deans, and others may
have differing opinions as to the quality of an institution from which a faculty
member received her degree, the prestige or importance of particular journals
in which a faculty member published, the significance and quality of a faculty
member's publications, the effectiveness of a member's teaching, and the
ability of a professor to work with her colleagues.38
II. THE TRADITIONAL JuDIcIAL ROLE AS TO REVIEWING EVALUATIONS
In many universities, the process of reappointment, promotion, and tenure
is shrouded in secrecy. Those who cast votes in the decision-making process
are rarely required to provide an account of their deliberations. And while
adverse personnel decisions are usually justified on grounds of inadequate
research or teaching, the criteria for promotion and tenure are often vaguely
defined and subjectively applied.39

13, at 169.
13, at 61.
13, at 61.
13, at 61.
39. LEAP, supra note 13, at 3-4. See also John DeWitt Gregory, Secrecy in

35.
36.
37.
38.

LEAP,
LEAP,
LEAP,
LEAP,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

University and College Tenure Deliberations: Placing Appropriate Limits on

Academic Freedom, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023 (1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to interfere in what has been
basically deemed an academic exercise. The courts recognize that the
evaluation of faculty performance is a "defining act of singular importance"
to academic institutions and have accepted the performance evaluation process
as essential to the "lifeblood and heartbeat" of academic excellence and vital
to the efficient functioning of colleges and universities. For the most part, the
courts have viewed the evaluation of academic performance as an exercise
outside the expertise of the courts and one better left to academicians."
Also, the judiciary has generally behaved as though it believed that evaluations
were made only after careful deliberation and with procedural due process
protections.4 In short, the judiciary has tended to act as if colleges and
universities could be trusted to act in good faith.
College and university administrators almost universally believe that
reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions are the prerogative of peer
review committees, department heads, deans, and others in the institution's
administrative hierarchy. Judicial intrusions are not welcome.42
Unfortunately, academic decisions are not always based on objective
standards and procedural due process is not always supplied. Politics and
personalities also play a part, as the courts are increasingly forced to
recognize.
Given the importance of reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions,
it is hardly surprising that disappointed faculty members have turned to the
courts for relief. This is especially true given the secretive nature of
institutional personnel decisions and the natural suspicion of wrongdoing
which can accompany such proceedings. Disappointed faculty members can
hardly be blamed for suspecting that their rejections have more to do with
personal bias, discrimination, or favoritism toward others rather than an honest
appraisal of a faculty member's accomplishments and abilities.

40. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir.
1983); Ford v. Nicks, 741 F.2d 858, 864 (6th Cir. 1984) ("federal courts have
generally deferred to the decisions of college and university officials in whether to
grant tenure"); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2nd Cir. 1980) (courts should not
sit as "Super-Tenure Review Committees"); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229,
1231-32 (2nd Cir. 1974) ("education and faculty appointments at a university level are
probably the least suited for federal court supervision"); Jonathan M. Paretsky, Judicial
Review of Discretionary Grants of Higher Education Tenure, 83 EDUC. L. REPTR.

(West) 17 (1993).
41. Courts have been reluctant to intervene in higher education faculty decisions
because they feel ill equipped to "micromanage" such institutions. "We have neither
the competence nor the resources to undertake to micromanage the administration of
thousands of state educational institutions." Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State
Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1991).
42. LEAP, supra note 13, at 5.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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Chairpersons, as well as promotion and tenure committees, may look for
excuses to support adverse prejudgments. Discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, or other questionable criteria may also be factors in the decision-making
process.43 Claims of discrimination in particular have encouraged greater
judicial review and activism as to judging faculty performance evaluations,
especially in light of legislation passed to eliminate discrimination.
Two other factors, academic freedom and tenure, are also encouraging the
judicial review of academic performance evaluations. The cases concerning
the legality of academic performance evaluations cannot be fully appreciated
without first recognizing how academic freedom and tenure rights color
judicial scrutiny.

A. Academic Freedom
Academic freedom is the right to engage in unfettered intellectual inquiry.
It is the freedom to conduct independent research and to teach not only one's
own findings, but those of other scholars as well. Academic freedom
guarantees educators independence from the interference of trustees,
administrators, other faculty members, students, alumni, and public opinion.'

43. Peter Seldin, Court Challengesto Tenure, PromotionandRetentionDecisions,
IDEA PAPER No. 12, 1 (Center for Faculty Evaluation and Development, Kansas State
University, Sept. 1989).

44. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has published a
Statement of Principles as to academic freedom:
Academic Freedom
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other
academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an
understanding with the authorities of the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing
his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of
academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution
should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a
learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he
speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship
or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special
obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should
remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his
utterances. Hence, he should at all times be accurate, should exercise
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and
should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional
spokesman.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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It is a freedom deemed essential 4to
protect scholarship and to preserve the
5
integrity of the education process.
Although the courts have been reluctant to raise academic freedom to the
level of a constitutional right, they have always given it great deference. In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,4 6 the United States Supreme Court stressed the
importance of academic freedom to a free society. Sweezy, a college faculty
member, claimed a First Amendment right to withhold information sought in
a legislative inquiry into his classroom speech. Chief Justice Warren,
commenting on the importance of academic freedom, stated:
To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and
universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education
is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always
47
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate.
Sweezy is the first case in which a majority of the Court mentioned
academic freedom. The Court delineated four essential freedoms of a
university. Those freedoms are the right "to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
48
may be admitted to study.,
Although academic freedom has not been universally recognized by the
courts as a constitutional right, it is nonetheless an extremely important right
which the courts have deemed must not be violated in the performance
evaluation process. Also, academic freedom is closely associated with the
First Amendment right of freedom of speech and some courts have deemed
it to be a First Amendment right in and of itself. Academic freedom is a
"special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cause a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom., 49 While the two rights are
not necessarily the same, they often overlap and that alone is sufficient to

27 AAUP BULL. 40 (1941), reprinted in

FACULTY TENURE:
A REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 250 (1973).

45. Steven G. Olswang and Jane T. Fantel, Tenure and PeriodicPerformance
Review: Compatible Legal and Administrative Principles,7 J. C. & U. L. 1, 2-3
(1980-81).

46. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
47. Id. at 250.
48. Id. at 263.
49. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
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trigger judicial scrutiny when the performance evaluation process threatens to
impinge on the First Amendment.
But academic freedom consists not only of a robust and uninhibited
exchange of ideas between a professor and students and the freedom of the
individual professor to pursue her own ends without interference from the
institution, but also in the educational institution's own autonomous decision
making. Often these two freedoms conflict.5 As explained in this Article,
when a conflict occurs between the institution's claim of academic freedom
and that of the individual professor, the institution will prevail unless the
institution is violating a constitutionally protected freedom. Nontenured
faculty members are particularly vulnerable to dismissal by institutions when
such conflicts occur because nontenured faculty members lack a property
interest in their positions.
B. Tenure
Of course the right to academic freedom means very little if by exercising
it the educator suffers, or runs the risk of suffering, financial consequences.
To a large extent the tenure system grew out of the need to provide
academicians with a certain amount of job security. In exercising academic
freedom about controversial subjects, it is possible to raise the ire of
administrators, fellow faculty, students, and the general public. Tenure
preserves academic freedom by protecting educators from arbitrary
dismissal.5 A tenured professor's employment will not be terminated except

50. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985);

Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied,474 U.S. 1007 (1985); see also Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden ofProofand
Academic Freedom:Protectionfor Institution or Individual?, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 492,
493 (1988).

51. Along with its Statement of Principles as to academic freedom the AAUP set
out its principles as to tenure:
Academic Tenure
(a)

After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or

investigators should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service
should be terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case of
retirement for age or under extraordinary circumstances because offinancial
exigencies.
In the interpretation of this principle it is understood that the following
represents acceptable academic practice:
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every appointment should be
stated in writing and be in the possession of both institution and teacher
before the appointment is consummated.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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for stated and proven substantive causes, or for valid institutional financial
exigencies.52
To obtain tenure a professor must complete a probationary period in
which her performance is evaluated by her peers. Tenure is granted only
when the candidate's evaluators determine that she has achieved a certain

(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or
a higher rank, the probationary period should not exceed seven years,
including within this period full-time service in all institutions of higher
education, but subject to the proviso that when-after a term of probationary
service of more than three years in one or more institutions-a teacher is
called to another institution, it may be agreed in writing that his new
appointment is for a probationary period of not more than four years, even
though thereby the person's total probationary period in the academic
profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years. Notice
should be given at least one year prior to the expiration of the probationary
period if the teacher is not to be continued in service after the expiration of
that period.
(3) During the probationary period a teacher should have the
academic freedom that all other members of the faculty have.
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the
dismissal for cause of a teacher, previous to the expiration of a term
appointment, should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee
and the governing board of the institution. In all cases where the facts are
in dispute, the accused teacher should be informed before the hearing in
writing of the charges against him and should have the opportunity to be
heard in his own defense by all bodies that pass judgment upon his case.
He should be permitted to have with him an adviser of his own choosing
who may act as counsel. There should be a full stenographic record of the
hearing available to the parties concerned. In the hearing of charges of
incompetence the testimony should include that of teachers and other
scholars, either from his own or from other institutions. Teachers on
continuous appointment who are dismissed for reasons not involving moral
turpitude should receive their salaries for at least a year from the date of
notification of dismissal whether or not they are continued in their duties
at the institution.
(5) Termination of a continuous appointment because of financial
exigency should be demonstrably bonafide.
27 AAUP BULL. 40 (1941), reprinted in FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

BY THE COMMISSION

ON ACADEMIC

TENURE

IN HIGHER

EDUCATION 250-52 (1973) (emphasis added).
52. "The purpose of tenure is to protect academic freedom-the freedom to teach
and write without fear of retribution for expressing heterodox ideas...." Grimes v.
Eastern I11.
Univ., 710 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1983).
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academic proficiency and is likely to continue with that proficiency. 3
Increased prestige, compensation, and freedom accompany academic tenure. 4
Historically, courts have given institutions of higher education much
greater discretion in dealing with nontenured faculty as opposed to tenured
faculty. This difference in treatment arises out of the generally held belief of
the courts that tenure, once granted, becomes a property right.5 However,
as discussed later, 6 the property interest does not attach prior to the granting
of tenure.
In determining whether tenure should be granted, the courts recognize
that there is no single determining factor, such as the achievement or failure
to achieve a doctorate. Academic merit is made up of many factors, all of
which go into the tenure equation. 7
The evaluation of an institution's denial of tenure is further complicated
because simply meeting the basic requirements for tenure through teaching,
research and scholarship, and public service does not guarantee tenure. The
fact that a university sets up objective criteria to measure academic
performance does not constrict its traditional discretion in granting tenure. 8
Other factors, independent of qualifications, also go into the determination,
such as university budget considerations, enrollment projections, course needs,
the candidate's relationship to other professors, and the foreclosing of future
tenure grants. 9 Also, the existence of a formal tenure system does not, in
the absence of unusual circumstances, confer a property interest on
probationary employees.' But, as seen in the cases set forth in this Article,
the courts are not inclined to totally abrogate judicial review of the tenure
process. In particular, courts are not reluctant to review the performance
evaluation process once tenure has been granted and property rights have
attached.

53. LEAP, supra note 13, at 36-41.
54. University Educ. Ass'n. v. University of Minn., 353 N.W.2d 534, 540 (Minn.
1984).
55. See infra part III.A.2.
56. See infra part III.1.A.
57. Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,459 U.S.
830 (1982).
58. Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 422 (1st Cir.
1986); Chinea v. Benitez, 702 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D. P. R. 1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 854
(lst Cir. 1989).
59. Mayberry, 663 F.2d at 519 n.37.
60. Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 875 (1st Cir. 1981).
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES
Encouraged by laws against discrimination and a perceived increase in
activism on the part of courts to protect academic freedom and tenure rights,
a number of legal challenges have been made by faculty members regarding
performance evaluations. These challenges basically break down into issues
of substantive due process, procedural due process, First Amendment rights,
and statutory protection from discrimination.
A. Substantive Due Process
Academicians who are denied continued employment, promotion, or
tenure often claim that their substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution have been violated.
Success under a claim of violation of substantive due process depends upon
the complainant's ability to demonstrate that, as a result of state action, she
has suffered the unlawful denial of an identified liberty or property interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."'
Not every property interest, however, is entitled to substantive due
process protection. Only property rights denied under the Constitution, as
opposed to state law, are entitled to protections of substantive due process. 62
Substantive due process applies to those interests so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be characterized as fundamental, such as
marriage, procreation, and family life.63
1. Pretenure and Substantive Due Process Claims
Substantive due process claims have repeatedly been made where faculty
have been denied tenure. Candidates denied tenure have claimed a right of
judicial review regarding the correctness of the decisions on the basis that the
denial of tenure is the denial of a constitutionally protected property right.

61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; See Coyne v. City of Somerville, 770 F. Supp.
740, 746 (D. Mass. 1991) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923));
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,244 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 315, 319 (1982); Jonathan M. Paretsky, JudicialReviewofDiscretionary
Grants of HigherEducation Tenure, 83 EDUC. L. RPTR. 17, 18-22 (1993).
62. University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985).

63. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989); Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979) (percuriam).
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a. Denial
of Tenure and Property
I
The courts have universally rejected the idea that the denial of tenure
affects a property right, even in the face of some rather novel arguments. In
Scharf v. Regents of California,' an assistant professor denied tenure
following a probationary period claimed his property rights had been affected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Specifically, the professor contended that the denial of tenure
prevented him from obtaining employment elsewhere, because under
University of California policy any assistant professor denied tenure at one
campus could not be hired at any other campus of the University."5
The California Supreme Court, however, refused to depart from its
previous case rulings that the denial of tenure does not deprive a person of the
ability to seek other employment in his profession. The professor was still
free to seek employment at other universities outside of the University of
California system and thus was not deprived of a property right.66
The court also rejected the professor's argument that tenure denial by a
prestigious university so stigmatizes the denied professor as to support a due
process liberty interest claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
noted that an institution's prestige is to a large extent a reflection of the
eminence of its faculty and the standards it imposes in the process of academic
peer review. The failure to achieve tenure at a university with exceedingly
high standards of review is presumably less stigmatizing than the failure to
achieve tenure at a less prestigious institution. 7
In a number of cases, candidates denied tenure have argued that the
tenure review procedures themselves create a Fourteenth Amendment property
interest. This claim is basically a circular one. The candidates argue that the
institution's detailed tenure procedures provide due process guarantees which
in turn create the property interest protected by those guarantees. While such
a clever argument has a certain appeal to it, the courts have rejected it as
being conceptually unacceptable. 68

64. 286 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
65. Id. at 236.

66. Id See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
67. Scharf 286 Cal. Rptr. at 236; but see LEAP, supra note 13, at 4, 5 (arguing

that the denial of tenure places a professor's future academic employment in jeopardy
because of the stigma attached to the denial and the academic community's view that
the professor is now "tainted goods").
68. See, e.g., Siuv. Johnson, 748 F.2d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 1984); Shango v. Jurich,
681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298-99
(6th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Kneller, 482 F. Supp. 204, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd mem.,
633 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980). But see Skehan v. Board
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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b. Tenure as an Entitlement
Although pretenure employment is not a vested property right, it can
become an entitlement under appropriate circumstances. For example, in
Perry v. Sindermann,69 the respondent's employment at a junior college was
declared to be an entitlement because the college's official "Faculty Guide"
stated that "the Administration of the college wishes the faculty member to
feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are
satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his
coworkers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.""0
The effect of the "Faculty Guide" in Perryv. Sindermannwas to narrow
the evaluation process to (1) satisfactory teaching services, (2) a cooperative
attitude with coworkers and superiors, and (3) the personal happiness of the
teacher. The "Faculty Guide" also constituted a contract between the faculty
member and the college which transcended any other more formal evaluation
process set up by the college. 7'
Besides faculty guides and other written promises of continued
employment, actions and verbal statements can result in the creation of a
property interest protected under the substantive due process provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If an educational institution by its conduct creates
an "expectancy of permanent employment" following the satisfactory
completion of a probationary period, the expectancy may rise to the level of
a property interest.72 When that happens, the courts are obligated to forgo
their usual judicial deferenceto academic matters and to enforce the claimant's
property rights.
But, absent the creation of a property interest through promises made in
a faculty handbook, or through the creation of an expectancy of permanent
employment by some other means, courts have universally refused to
of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 485 (3rd Cir. 1978) (professor said to have property interest
in procedures established by college's statement of policy), cert. denied,444 U.S. 832
(1979).
69. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
70. Id. at 600; contra Dunfey v. Roger Williams Univ., 824 F. Supp. 18, 21-22
(D. Mass. 1993) (college personnel manual did not create contractual rights since the
manual specified it could be amended at any time); Spular v. Picker, 958 F.2d 103,
106 (5th Cir. 1992) (college handbook was not a written employment agreement);
Marson v. Northwestern State Univ., 607 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(policy handbook was not part of the employment contract).
71. Perry, 408 U.S. at 600-02.
72. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,444
U.S. 832 (1979); Mabye v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1976); Patrick W.
McKee, Tenure By Default: The Non-FormalAcquisition ofAcademic Tenure, 7 J.C.
& U. L. 31, 51-52 (1980-81).
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recognize that a nontenured professor has a property interest in his continued
employment.
c. Pretenureand Subjective Evaluations
The distinction made by the courts between the property rights of
nontenured and tenured employees also directly affects the scope of judicial
review as far as personnel decisions are concerned. Prior to the granting of
tenure, courts are inclined to give great deference to what is basically an
academic evaluation which may use primarily subjective standards.
The courts have repeatedly recognized that the questions of a faculty
member's competence and qualifications for salary increases, promotion,
retention, and tenure are highly subjective determinations that do not lend
themselves to precise qualifications, mechanical measurements, or the use of
standardized tests." The subjective nature of measuring a candidate's
qualifications makes it extremely difficult for those outside the college or
university to evaluate such decisions.74
As a general rule, in claims of substantive due process violations, judicial
review will not function de novo to determine whether the court would have
denied a salary increase, promotion, retention, or tenure as to a faculty
member based on the same evidence before an institution's evaluation
committees. Instead, the court's role is limited to examining the institution's
proceedings to determine if substantial evidence existed to support its
determination."
An excellent example of this deference is found in Siu v. Johnson.76
Siu, a Catholic nun of Oriental heritage, was an assistant professor from 1976
to 1982 at George Mason University, where she was the university's only East
Asian faculty member. At the end of her sixth year of employment, which
constituted her tenure track probationary period, Siu was eligible to be
considered for tenure. The faculty handbook stated that faculty being
considered for tenure would be evaluated on the basis of teaching
performance, research, scholarship, and university service. The handbook
specified sixteen evaluation criteria used to determine if a candidate would be
granted tenure.77
Like most universities, George Mason had several levels of review for
tenure candidates. As detailed in the faculty handbook, candidates were first
evaluated by departmental faculty in accordance with the stated substantive

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 519 (4th Cir. 1981).

Id.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 325-26 (1975).
748 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 240-41.
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The departmental chairman then transmitted his or her
criteria.
recommendation, along with the faculty recommendations, to the advisory
committee on promotions and tenure for the relevant university college and its
dean. The advisory committee then solicited input from the candidate and the
candidate's department and made its own recommendation. The vice president
for academic affairs then reviewed the committee's recommendation and made
a recommendation to the university president, who ultimately rendered a final
decision.78
Siu received favorable tenure recommendations until she reached the
higher administrative levels. At the graduate dean level and beyond it was
recommended that she not be granted tenure because of a "clear lack of strong
and consistent scholarship." The vice president for academic affairs also
concluded that Siu had failed to establish excellence in teaching.79
After being denied tenure, Siu filed a cause of action against the
university and the administrators who denied her tenure on the basis that the
denial violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process
clauses. She claimed discrimination by the university because of her national
origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.80 Siu eventually
dismissed the university as a defendant, but continued to seek injunctive relief
as well as damages against the individual defendants.8 '
The court quickly dismissed Siu's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because
she was unable to show that the defendants purposefully discriminated against
her on racial grounds.82 The court then went on to examine Siu's claim of
denial of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
The court noted that the threshold question under a § 1983 claim is
whether a constitutionally protected interest exists. Relying on Board of
Regents v. Roth" and Megill v. Board of Regents,85 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that "[G]iven the nature of the classic tenure track
probationary appointment, there is a real question whether in that classic form
it gives rise to a constitutionally protected property interest that survives the
normal expiration of its term."86 Instead, it is no more than an employment
at will that simply gives rise to a unilateral expectation that permanent

78. Id.
at 240.
79. Id. at 240-41.
80. See infra part III.C.2.b.

81. Siu, 748 F.2d at 241; see also infra part III.C.2.b.
82. Siu, 748 F.2d at 241-42 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45
(1976)).
83. Id. at 242.

84. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1986).
85. 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976).
86. Siu, 748 F.2d at 243.
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employment will follow the probationary term if certain conditions and the
employer's expectations are met by the employee."
However, although the court rejected Siu's property right claim, the court
assumed, for appeal purposes only, the existence of a protected property right
in order to review the denial of due process claim. It was in reviewing the
university's tenure process that the court delineated the difference between
academic evaluations and disciplining or fact-finding dismissals. Pretenure
decisions involve primarily subjective evaluations dependent upon the
professional judgment of persons presumed to possess special competence in
making such evaluations. "The procedures prescribed for making the tenure
decision-including the decision not to award tenure, thereby 'terminating'
whatever interest may have existed-plainly contemplate a subjective,
evaluative decisional process by academic professionals rather than an
objective fact-finding process by tribunals adapted to that quite different
88
purpose.1
The court went on to state that this subjective decision-making process
is not in essence an adversarial fact-finding procedure "for which fairly
stringent judicial review to insure [sic] adequacy is both necessary and
possible, but is one much more
subjective and less susceptible, therefore, to
89
fine-tuned judicial review.1
The court refused to inquire into the wisdom of the decision of
administrators to deny Siu tenure despite Siu's favorable recommendations at
the lower review levels because it is inappropriate for the courts to inquire
into the wisdom, prudence, or informed nature of the decision finally made by
academicians as to the conferring of academic tenure. 9 Due process does
not require that "administrators up the reviewing line defer to previous peer
faculty evaluations, even if it is customary to do so."'"
Siu had been denied tenure due to a perception that she lacked scholarly
potential. The court held that the decision-making process used satisfied the
demands of procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
for the protection of whatever property interest she might have had in her
expectation of continued employment beyond the probationary term.
What Siu v. Johnson and similar cases establish is that the courts use a
rather lenient standard in determining whether a college or university has
violated the substantive due process rights of a nontenured faculty member in

87. Id.
88. Id.at 244.
89. Id.at 244-45.
90. Id.at 245.

91. Id.
92. Id.at 246.
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denying promotion. The courts do not strictly scrutinize the performance
evaluation process used regarding nontenured faculty.
Further, in reviewing nontenured faculty decisions, whether a
performance evaluation process complies with substantive due process is
usually judged by the courts under the arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of
process standard. Courts retain their inherent reluctance to interfere in the
evaluation process, and this reluctance extends to any promotion and
termination decisions resulting from the evaluations. In passing upon the
criteria used by educational institutions regarding substantive due process
requirements, the courts look only to whether the evaluation decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. So long as there is competent
and credible evidence to support the evaluator's decision, the final
determination on promotion or termination will not be disturbed by the courts.
Although the case involved a secondary education institution as opposed
to a college or university, and is a state supreme court case as opposed to a
federal court case, Nordhagen v. Hot Springs School Distrid3 is a good
substantive due process example. In Nordhagen, a school board refused to
renew a principal's contract. The decision was based upon the following
evaluation made by the principal's superintendent:
1. Nordhagen lacked professional growth, leadership and conduct.
2. Nordhagen failed to perform evaluations on the teachers he supervised.
3. Nordhagen's skills as an educator were lacking. Nordhagen was
negative to parents and grandparents in the area of public relations and
understanding, took a rigid stand, and challenged the validity, jurisdiction
and legality of the courts.
4. Nordhagen demonstrated an insensitivity to students' needs and
feelings, and negatively approached developing the self-image of specific
students. 94

The South Dakota Supreme Court refused to overturn the school board's
decision supporting the superintendent's recommendation not to renew
Nordhagen's contract. The court noted that substantive due process only
requires that decisions of nonrenewal not be exercised unreasonably or
arbitrarily, or be manifestly abused. Such decisions need only be supported
by substantial evidence. The requirement of substantive due process is
satisfied if a board bases its decision upon competent, credible evidence,
which is what the board did regarding Nordhagen. 95 There is a presumption
of "good faith" as to a schoolboard's decisions and the complaining party has

93. 474 N.W.2d 510 (S.D. 1991).
94. Id. at 511-12 n.1.
95. Id at 513.
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the burden of proof to overcome the presumption. Nordhagen failed to carry
96
this burden of proof.
2. Posttenure Review and "Just Cause"
While the courts are reluctant to review personnel decisions regarding
nontenured faculty, that reluctance no longer exists after tenure is granted.
Once tenure is granted, the faculty member is vested with a property right
protected under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, courts no longer use a review standard based on
arbitrary or capricious conduct, or on an abuse of discretion. Instead, the
courts more closely examine the facts and evidence in each case to determine
whether the evaluators had "just cause" for their decision. If a tenured faculty
member is denied promotion or dismissed from the faculty, the action must
be supported by "just cause. 9 7 Because a fundamental property right is at
stake, there is no presumption in favor of the action taken.98
Also, in those cases where a nontenured faculty member raises questions
concerning the nonrenewal of her employment or the denial of a promotion,
the burden of proof lies with the nontenured individual to make a prima facie
showing that the institution's conduct was based on constitutionally
impermissible reasons.9 9 In comparison, once a faculty member has been

awarded tenure, the burden of proof lies with the institution to establish that
employment or denial of promotion
adverse decisions concerning continued
0
cause."'1
"just
by
supported
are
Because the actions taken by the administration in response to the
performance evaluation must be supported by "just cause," specific and
objective criteria which clearly measure academic performance become much
more important. In cases involving constitutionally protected property rights,
courts will not hesitate to overturn an academic decision which cannot be
substantiated.
However, tenure is not a guarantee of permanent employment and even
a tenured faculty member's employment can be terminated for "just cause."
Some states have by statute specified what constitutes "just cause" for the
termination of the employment of tenured faculty members. For example, the
state of Tennessee lists the following as "justcause" for termination of tenured
state university or college faculty members:

96. Id. at 513-14. See also Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 25

(S.D. 1989); Jones v. Sully Buttes Sch., 340 N.W.2d 697, 700 (S.D. 1983).
97. Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 8.

98. Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 8.
99. Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 8.

100. Olswang & Fantel, supranote 45, at 8.
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(1)Incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research;
(2)Willful failure to perform the duties and responsibilities for which the
faculty member was employed, or refusal or continued failure to comply
with the policies of the board, institution or department, or to carry out
specific assignments, when such policies or assignments are reasonable and
nondiscriminatory;
(3)Conviction of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude;
(4)Improper use of narcotics or intoxicants which substantially impairs the
faculty member's fulfillment of his department and institutional duties and
responsibilities;
(5)Capricious disregard of accepted standards of professional conduct;
(6)Falsification of information on an employment application or other
information concerning qualifications for a position; and
(7)Failure to maintain the level of professional excellence and ability
demonstrated by other members ofthe faculty in the department or division
of the institution.' 01
Tennessee also requires that adequate cause for termination be proved by clear
and convincing evidence."°
In the overwhelming majority of states, however, what constitutes "just
cause" for termination of employment is left to the institutions to define. In
addition, "just cause" for termination generally requires a lesser standard of
proof than the highly restrictive "clear and convincing evidence" standard. As
previously discussed, an employment termination decision involving a tenured
faculty member will not be disturbed so long as there is substantial evidence
to support the decision and, as is explained later in this Article, the reason
given for the termination was not merely a pretext to hide discriminatory
conduct. 0 3
The list of "just causes" for employment termination set forth in the
Tennessee statute is indicative of valid grounds for termination of tenured
faculty recognized by state courts. Some case examples of the termination of
the employment of tenured faculty have already been set forth in this
Article.' 4 The following are additional examples:
a. Immorality
Immorality has served as a legitimate basis for the termination of the
employment of tenured faculty, although it is an admittedly ambiguous

101. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-8-302 (1990), citedin Frye v. Memphis State Univ.,
806 S.W. 2d 170, 172 (Tenn. 1991).
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-8-303 (1990).
103. See infra parts III.C.2.a-e.
104. See supra parts I.C.1-4.
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concept as to what constitutes "immoral conduct," "actions of moral turpitude,"
or "evident unfitness to teach."' 5 Yet, regardless of the inherent vagueness
of the concept, dismissals have been upheld in a number of cases on charges
of immorality. For example, the dismissal of a University of Illinois tenured
professor was upheld on the grounds that he published in the student
newspaper an essay which contained what the court described as a "liberal
approach to the problems concerning morality on modem day university
campuses."'"
The dismissal of a tenured junior college professor was also upheld in the
case of Palo Verde Unified School District of Riverside County v. Hensey °7
on grounds of evident unfitness for service. The objectionable conduct
consisted of the professor ripping out the college bell system speaker in his
classroom because it sounded like a "worn out phonograph in a whorehouse,"
the frequent use of vulgarity in the classroom, and the making of disparaging
and vulgar remarks in his classroom about the district superintendent. 10 8
Although the professor's conduct did not quite rise to the level of
immorality, the court found his conduct to be inexcusable. The teacher had
violated his duty to respect the feelings and sensibilities of his students and to
conduct himself with a certain degree of rectitude."' 9
Of course, the most common connotation of immorality involves sexual
impropriety between faculty and students, as was the case in Board of Trustees
of Compton Junior College Districtof Los Angeles County v. Stubblefield."0
A junior college teacher was dismissed after (1) he was found by a policeman
to be parked in a school parking lot with a female student in a state of
undress; and (2) he physically assaulted the policeman in an attempt to escape
arrest."'
The case of Lehmann v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College"2 also
involved the dismissal of a tenured faculty member for sexual impropriety.
The professor's misconduct consisted of sexual advances to students, female
staff, faculty members, and the wives of faculty and staff members." 3

105. Olswang & Fantel, supranote 45, at 14.
106. Koch v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of 1li., 187 N.E.2d 340, 342 (III.
App. Ct. 1963); Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 14.
107. 88 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45,

at 15.
108.
109.
110.
at 15.
111.
112.
113.

Hensey, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 572; Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 15.
Hensey, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 576; Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 15.
94 Cal Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45,
Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 16.
576 P.2d 397 (Wash. 1978); Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 16.
Lehmann, 576 P.2d at 398; Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 16.
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In Korf v. Ball State University,"4 a tenured professor's dismissal was
upheld because the professor had made sexual advances toward his male
students. Some current and former male students accused the professor, Korf,
of sexual harassment. The harassment consisted of unwelcome sexual
advances and also offers of quid pro quo exchanges in which good grades
were offered to the students in exchange for sexual involvement." 5 One
student alleged that he received money and gifts from the professor in
exchange for sexual acts, as well as a promise of good grades." 6
The university formed a committee to hear testimony as to the
accusations made against Professor Korf. The committee found Korf guilty
of unethical conduct in that he used his position and influence to exploit
students for his private advantage. The evidence established a pattern of
conduct in which Korf built friendly, personal relationships with students and
then made sexual advances."' The committee recommended that Korf be
placed on three years probation instead of being discharged because it felt that
Korf had not been provided "ample warning and opportunity for behavioral
change." 1

The committee's report and recommendation were given to Ball State
University's Board of Trustees for review. After hearing oral arguments from
the university's counsel, as well as Dr. Korf's, the Trustees agreed with the
committee's finding of unethical conduct. It refused, however, to accept the
recommendation of probation and sent the report back to the committee for
reconsideration. Upon reconsideration the committee recommended that Korf
be discharged and the Trustees then terminated Korf's employment." 9
Korf filed suit against the university under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20 He
contended that the termination of his employment violated his constitutional

114. 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 1224.
116. Id.

117. Ball State University had adopted paragraph 2 of the American Association
of University Professors ("AAUP") Statement on Professional Ethics which states that:
"2. As a teacher, the professor encourages the free pursuit of learning in his students.
He holds before them the best scholarly standards of his discipline. He demonstrates
respect for the student as an individual and adheres to his proper role as intellectual
guide and counselor. He makes every reasonable effort to foster honest academic

conduct and to assure that his evaluation of his students reflects their true merits. He
respects the confidential nature of the relationship between professor and student. He
avoids any exploitation of students for his private advantage and acknowledges
significant assistance from them. He protects their academic freedom." Id. at 1224
n.2.
118. Id.

119. Id.
at 1225.
120. Id; see infra part III.C.2.b.
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rights to substantive and procedural due process, equal protection, free speech,
freedom of association, and privacy.' The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Ball State University.'
On appeal, Dr. Korf argued
summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine fact issue existed as
to whether he had adequate notice that Ball State prohibited consensual sexual
relations between faculty members and students.'" Dr. Korf contended that
Ball State's policy did not clearly prohibit sexual relationships with students
and that he further lacked adequate notice because he was the first Ball State
faculty member ever disciplined for such conduct.'24
In affirming the district court's ruling in favor of Ball State, the appellate
court held that common sense, reason, and good judgment should have made
him cognizant that his behavior could lead to his dismissal. The court also
noted that one cannot claim it is somehow unfair to be the first person
disciplined under a particular rule or regulation. To accept Korf s argument
would mean that no new law, rule, or regulation could ever be enforced. 5
The court also held that Korf's conduct was not to be viewed in the same
context as the conduct of an "ordinary person on the street." Instead, his
conduct was to be judged in the context of the relationship between a
professor and his students in an academic environment.'26 Ball State's
action in dismissing Korf was "rationally related to its responsibility to
establish and maintain high ethical standards within the University in order to
maintain a proper academic environment."'2 7
b. Abusive Conduct
The courts have also upheld the dismissal of tenured faculty who were
abusive toward students and colleagues. In one instance, a tenured faculty
member's dismissal was upheld where the university showed that the professor
(1) was a poor teacher who rarely prepared for classes; (2) had little interest
in his students and failed to interact with them; (3) failed to keep office hours;
(4) failed to advise students; (5) was uncooperative with colleagues and the

121. Dr. Korf also made state law claims for breach of his employment contract
and infliction of emotional distress. Korf 726 F.2d at 1225.
122. Korf 726 F.2d at 1225.
123. Although Korf admitted that he was aware that Ball State University had
adopted AAUP's Statement on Professional Ethics, he contended that the statement
could not reasonably be interpreted to include "consensual sexual relationships" with
students. Id at 1226.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1227.
126. Id
127. Id. at 1229.
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administration; (6) ignored his superiors' directives as well as the university
policies and procedures; and (7) recklessly, and untruthfully, accused his
superiors of incompetence and discriminatory practices against him. Although
the professor's general incompetence was a factor in his dismissal, his abusive
treatment of others played a significant role in the administration's
decision.128
In Keen v. Penson,129 a university professor was properly sanctioned
with demotion and loss of salary due to his treatment of a student. The
professor gave the student an unfair grade and then sent demeaning and
insulting letters to the student. 3 °
An extreme example of a tenured professor abusing students is found in
San Filippo v. Bongiovanni.'

Professor San Filippo, a member of Rutgers

University's faculty of Arts and Sciences, was accused of abusing Chinese
scholars brought to Rutgers to work with him. The Chinese scholars accused
him of verbal abuse, harassment, exploitation, intimidation, fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation.'
Over a period of several months, Rutgers took various administrative
actions to investigate and dispose of the charges against Professor San
Filippo.' Eventually, the professor was charged with, and given notice of,
the particulars against him, including such conduct as forcing the Chinese
scholars to perform domestic work for him, deducting the cost of health
benefits from their salaries without providing such benefits, threatening to
send the scholars back to China, verbally abusing the scholars in front of
others, and admitting Chinese scholars to the postdoctoral fellowship who
lacked appropriate credentials.'
At Professor San Filippo's request, he was provided with a formal
hearing before five members of the University Senate (the panel). 3 ' After
250 hours of testimony, Professor San Filippo was found guilty of most of the
charges filed against him.'36 The panel found that adequate cause existed
to strip Professor San Filippo of his tenure and to dismiss him from Rutgers

128. Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ., 426 F. Supp 218 (E.D.N.C. 1976); See also
Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45,48 (Tenn. 1993); Timothy B. Lovain,
Groundsfor Dismissing Tenured PostsecondaryFaculty For Cause, 10 J.C. & U.L.
419 (1983-84).

129. 970 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1992).
130. Id at 253.

131. 961 F.2d 1125 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 908 (1992).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id at 1128.
Id
Id. at 1129-30.
Id. at 1130.
Id at 1130, 1132.
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in that he violated university regulation 3.94, which defines adequate cause as
"failure to maintain standards of sound scholarship and competent teaching,
or gross neglect of established University obligations appropriate to the
appointment, or incompetence,
or incapacitation or conviction of a crime of
1

moral turpitude.'

Professor San Filippo brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
district court held that the grounds set forth in the university regulations for
dismissing tenured professors were
void for vagueness and certified an appeal
3
on the void for vagueness issue.1 1
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that, as a tenured
professor, San Filippo had a property interest in his position which was
139
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court further noted that property interests protected by procedural due
process go beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money, and
include a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. 40 The court
further found, however, that the issue of procedural due process had not been
ruled upon by the district court and that only the void for vagueness issue was
As to that issue, the Third Circuit held that the
before the court.'
vagueness doctrine is based on fair notice that certain conduct puts persons at
risk of discharge. 2 "Such standards are not void for vagueness as long as
ordinary persons using ordinary common sense would be notified that certain
conduct will put them at risk of discharge." 43
As to Rutgers' dismissal regulations, the court held that, although they
were broad and general, they were not unconstitutionally vague.'" "It is not
unfair or unforeseeable for a tenured professor to be expected to behave
decently towards students and coworkers, to comply with a superior's
directive, and to be truthful and forthcoming in dealing with payroll, federal
research funds or applications for academic positions. Such behavior is
required for the purpose of maintaining sound scholarship and competent
teaching."' 4

137. Id. at 1128, 1132-33.

138. Id. at 1126 (citing San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 743 F. Supp. 327, 329 (D.
N.J. 1990)).
139. Id at 1134.
140. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
141. Id at 1135.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 1136 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974)).
144. Id. at 1137.

145. Id
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c. Insubordination,ContractBreaches, and Violations of University
Rules and Regulations
Although dismissals on grounds of insubordination are rare, it is a valid
basis for dismissing even tenured faculty members. In one instance a tenured
associate professor was dismissed for missing classes after he was expressly
denied permission to miss classes. It had been determined that missing classes
would adversely affect the students.'46
In Gross v. University of Tennessee,'47 the dismissal of two tenured
professors was upheld after they violated university policy involving external
activities and income.'48 The professors were required to devote their full
time and efforts to the university, yet they engaged in the unlimited private
practice of medicine.' 49 The court refused to reinstate the professors on the
grounds that (1) the professors did not have a constitutionally protected right
to engage in outside activities; and (2) the outside income limits placed by the
university upon faculty were rationally related to the legitimate goals of
fostering full-time devotion to teaching duties. 5 '
A tenured professor's failure to complete work and reports required for
projects under contract by the university and the failure to follow university
rules and regulations led to a dismissal in Bates v. Sponberg."S The court
refused to accept the professor's contention that his actions were actually a
form of protest against the university's accounting procedures.' 52
In comparison, in McConnell v. Howard University,'

the court held

that a genuine fact issue existed as to whether a tenured university professor's
failure to teach an assigned class was neglect of his professional duties.'54
A conflict arose between Professor McConnell, a white professor, and one of
the forty black students in a math course entitled Elementary Functions I, a
course similar to Algebra II.'
The conflict arose following a single
question math quiz in which only five of the forty students correctly answered
the question. After the poor performance of his students, Professor
McConnell advised them to cut back on other activities and to concentrate on
their studies. To emphasize his point, Professor McConnell told the fable of

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 17.
448 F. Supp 245 (W.D. Tenn. 1978), af'd, 620 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.; Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 18.

151. 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976); Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 18.
152. Bates, 547 F.2d at 328; Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 18.

153. 818 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 59.
155. Id at 60.
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a monkey who put his hand into a cookie jar and was unable to get it back out
because he grabbed too many cookies and was unwilling to let any go. 156
One of the students took exception to McConnell's comments and called
him a "condescending, patronizing racist." McConnell demanded that the
student apologize and she refused."5 7 In subsequent class meetings,
McConnell asked the student to apologize and she continued to refuse. After
one refusal, McConnell dismissed class and told the students he would not
return until the "right atmosphere" was created by either the student
apologizing or removing herself from class.' 58
McConnell then requested that the university take disciplinary action
against the student. Instead, McConnell was instructed to resume teaching the
class. Upon his continued refusal to teach the class he was warned by the vice
president for academic affairs that action would be taken against him. 9
A grievance committee was convened to conduct a hearing and make
findings and recommendations. The committee concluded that Professor
McConnell did not neglect his professional responsibility. Although failure
to teach an assigned class might ordinarily justify termination of employment,
it did not warrant such action as to Professor McConnell given the mitigating
circumstances." 0
The committee also criticized the university's
administration for not adequately supporting Professor McConnell.
Regardless of the committee's report, the Board of Trustees voted to
terminate McConnell's employment. McConnell then filed suit claiming that
Howard University had breached its employment contract with him. 62
The district court ruled in favor of the university and held that McConnell
had violated the provision of the faculty handbook by neglecting his
professional responsibilities.'63 In overruling the district court's decision,
the court of appeals held that the term "neglect" necessarily implied an
assessment of McConnell's conduct in the factual context in which it occurred
and whether his actions were within the acceptable range of conduct within his
profession.'"
The court not only found Professor McConnell's actions to have been
reasonable, but also concluded that a factual issue existed as to whether the

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
Id
Id. at 62.
Id
Id. at 63.
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McConnell had argued
university breached its contract with McConnell.'
that the faculty handbook created an implied obligation on the part of the
university to rectify incidents such as the one which occurred in his class and,
because it failed to do so, the university could not terminate his contract of
employment.' The appellate court sent the case back to the district court
with the instruction that Professor McConnell was to be permitted to show that
the university failed in its duty to protect McConnell's professional authority.
The court also noted that Professor McConnell had to prove that under the
contract the university's breach relieved him of his obligation to teach or that
the breach was such a mitigating factor that the university could not terminate
his contract.'67
d. Incompetence
Even a tenured professor can be dismissed for incompetence, as was done
in the case of Chung v. Park.1' Dr. Chung was dismissed because of
negative faculty ratings, bad student ratings, and his refusal to cooperate with
his colleagues to resolve the problems.1 9 The court made it clear that it
would not inquire as to the wisdom of the decision whether to terminate Dr.
Chung's employment except as to whether the action taken was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious.' ° Finding no such conduct on the part of the
institution regarding the action taken against Dr. Chung, the court refused to
reinstate his employment.''
e. Academic Dishonesty
Just as a student can be expelled from a college or university for
academic dishonesty, so can a tenured faculty member's employment be
terminated for academic dishonesty. In Agarwal,' a tenured professor's
dismissal was based to a large extent on a past incident of plagiarism with
three physics laboratory manuals for use in introductory courses.'
Although the professor was reprimanded for his plagiarism at the time of the

165. Id. at 64.
166. Id. at 65.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 65-66.
514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975).
Id at 384, 387.
Id, at 387.
Id.
See supra part I.C.2.
Agarwal v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1986).
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incident, the plagiarism was still a factor in a subsequent termination
action. 74 In upholding the professor's dismissal, the court rejected the
professor's claim that his constitutional rights were violated because his
plagiarism had already been punished. The court held that neither state law
nor the university's regulations precluded consideration of his past offense in
the context of proceedings for his discharge.'75
Yu v. Peterson7 6 is another plagiarism case which resulted in the
dismissal of a tenured faculty member at the University of Utah College of
Engineering. The professor plagiarized a joint research project by failing to
give credit to his co-author.'77 He also claimed credit for two8 publications
of which ninety percent was prepared by two of his students.1
An unusual aspect of the case involves the professor's use of the
grievance committee. He was originally given an extensive hearing before the
University of Utah's Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee.'79 The
Committee found the professor guilty of plagiarism and recommended that he
be suspended for one year without pay. The university president concurred
and issued the order of suspension.'
The professor then appealed his suspension in accordance with the
university's grievance process. He won his appeal and the case was remanded
to the Committee to cure procedural defects and to take further evidence. It
was after the remand and subsequent hearing that the professor was discharged
from the university.''
The professor then brought an action in federal court against the
university's president and grievance committee members.' He claimed that
the imposition of a greater sanction after his case was remanded deprived him
of due process of law.'
In upholding the dismissal, the court noted that valid nonvindictive
reasons existed for the enhanced penalty. At the second hearing, new,
probative evidence against the professor was introduced to support a stricter
penalty than first imposed.' 84

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id at 505-06.
Id. at 507.
13 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id.
at 1414.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1414-15.
Id.
at 1415.
Id at 1417.
Id
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3. Posttenure Review and Financial Exigency or Changes in
Academic Programs
Both tenured and nontenured faculty are subject to having their contracts
of employment terminated because of financial exigency. Dismissal for
financial exigency is not the same as dismissal for "just cause." Even a
tenured professor with an outstanding professional record of scholarship,
teaching, and public service can have her contract terminated during a
retrenchment process.
Krotkoff v. Goucher College... is a good example of a financial
exigency case. Krotkoff, a tenured professor in the German section of
Goucher College's modem language department, had her employment
terminated when the college went through a retrenchment process. Prior to
retrenchment, the college experienced six years of deficit spending with the
total deficit exceeding $1.5 million dollars. During that same period of time
the college also experienced a yearly reduction in enrollment, resulting in
reduced tuition and fee revenues.'86
Because of the retrenchment, Krotkoff's contract was not renewed, along
with the contracts of three other tenured faculty members. Eleven other
nontenured faculty members were also dismissed. Many of the faculty87
reductions occurred in the classics department, which was discontinued.
Although Krotkoff lost her position in the modem language department,
another tenured German professor retained herjob. The college explained that
there was a greater need to retain the other professor, who taught primarily
introductory language courses, including French, while Krotkoff taught mostly
advanced literature courses. 88
Krotkoff brought suit claiming the dismissal breached her tenure contract.
She claimed that the college bylaws provided that tenured faculty members
could only be dismissed for good cause (e.g., incompetency, neglect of duties,
or moral turpitude) and that financial exigency was not good cause.8 9
The college conceded that the bylaws did not mention financial
exigency.'9° It also conceded that financial exigency is not considered to be
a ground of dismissal for cause. The college also acknowledged Krotkoff to
be a fine teacher and that her termination of employment was not related to
her performance.' 9'

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 677.
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The college contended, however, that the national academic community
understood that the concept of tenure incorporates the right of an institution
to refuse to renew a tenured faculty member's contract because of financial
exigency so long as its actions are demonstrably bona fide. 92 To bolster its
claim, the college provided expert testimony from the director of the Office
of Academic Affairs of the American Council on Education. 93 The
college's expert based his opinion in part on the 1940 Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Tenure developed by the Association of American
Colleges and the American Association of University Professors, which states:
After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or investigators
should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their services should be
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for
age, 194 or under extraordinary circumstances because of financial
exigencies. In the interpretation of this principle it is understood that the
following represents acceptable academic practice... :
5. Termination of a continuous appointment because of financial
exigency should be demonstrably bona fide.195

At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Krotkoff and awarded her
damages of $180,000. The trial judge, however, set aside the verdict and
granted a new trial. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial judge's
decision favoring the college. 196 The appellate court noted that whether or
not a faculty member's contract contains an explicit reference to financial
exigency, a number of previously reported cases support the conclusion that
tenure is not understood to preclude a demonstrably bona fide dismissal for
financial reasons.' 97 "In whatever way the courts have chosen to view the
quality of the right or interest the tenured faculty member holds, there is little

192. Id. at 678.
193. Id. at 678-79.
194. This provision is no longer valid, see infra part III.C.2.d.
195. Krotkoff, 585 F.2d at 679.
196. Id. at 677.
197. Id. at 679 (citing Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843 (1975); Bellak
v. Franconia College, 386 A.2d 1266 (N.H. 1978); American Ass'n of Univ. Professors
v. Bloomfield College, 322 A. 2d 846 (N.J. Super. 1974), affd, 346 A. 2d 615 (N.J.

App. Div. 1975); Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 260 N.W. 2d 595 (Neb. 1975) (cases
in which courts interpreted contracts containing explicit references to financial
exigency); and Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 234-35 (W.D. Wis.
1974), affd, 510 F. 2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975)(table); Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F.

Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974); Rehov v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 331 N.E. 2d 416
(Ohio 1975) (cases in which contracts did not mention financial exigency)).
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doubt that tenure
is not enforceable if financial exigency is claimed and
98
supported."

Similarly, an institution of higher education has an implied contractual
right to terminate the employment of a tenured member of the faculty when
her position is eliminated as part of a change in an academic program. So
long as the institution acts in good faith and the termination is unavoidable,
there is no due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
tenured professor's property rights. 99
B. ProceduralDue Process
Just as the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees substantive due process
protection of vested property rights, it also provides procedural due process
protection." °
A person cannot be deprived of property or liberty by a state or its
officials without adhering to procedural due process. As determined by the
U.S. Supreme Court, the essential elements of procedural due process include:
(1) a hearing; (2) before an impartial decision-maker; (3) after reasonable
notice of charges; and (4) an opportunity to prepare and present a defense.2"'
However, the procedural due process required to be provided by colleges
and universities is not the same as that demanded in judicial proceedings.
Judicial proceedings are adversarial in nature and therefore demand a more
restrictive process. For example, in making tenure decisions a faculty member
involved in the evaluation process might also legitimately be involved in
making the ultimate recommendation as to the granting or denial of tenure.
The courts have refused to force those involved in the initial evaluation
procedure, such as department chairpersons, to recuse themselves from further
tenure consideration proceedings for the candidate. To do so would
unnecessarily expose the institution to turmoil and expense.0 2 Recusal will
only be required where it can be demonstrated that the faculty member
participating in the evaluation process has lost objectivity and has personalized

198. Id. at 679 (quoting from M. Mix, TENURE AND TERMINATION INFINANCIAL
10 (1978)).
199. Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1981); Bignall v. North Idaho
College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1976); Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d
EXIGENCY

843 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis.

1974), affd without opinion, 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
200. The due process clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment says that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
201. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
202. Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the evaluation process. In other words, the faculty member is no longer
performing a task from the university's perspective, but is involved in a
personal vendetta."'
1. Nontenured Faculty
Although the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment as to
academic decisions is not as rigorous as that for judicial proceedings, it is still
a valuable and substantial right. Unfortunately, a nontenured faculty member
cannot claim a right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment unless she can establish a property interest in her teaching
position or a liberty interest which a lack of procedural due process
threatens."'

203. Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,459 U.S.
830 (1982) (citing Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973)).

204. Fortunately for nontenured faculty members, some institutions of higher
learning have adopted the following AAUP recommended Statement of Procedural
Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments:
1. Criteria and Notice of Standards. Probationary faculty members should
be advised, early in their appointment, of the substantive and procedural
standards generally accepted in decisions affecting renewal and tenure. Any
special standards adopted by their particular departments or schools should
be brought to their attention.
2. (a) Periodic Review. There should be provision for periodic review
of a faculty member's situation during the probationary service.
(b) Opportunity to Submit Material. Probationary faculty members
should be advised of the time when decisions affecting renewal and
tenure are ordinarily made, and they should be given the opportunity
to submit material that they believe will be helpful to an adequate
consideration of their circumstances.
3. Notice of Reasons. In the event of a decision not to renew an
appointment, the faculty member should be informed of the decision in
writing, and, upon request, be advised of the reasons which contributed to
that decision. The faculty member should also have the opportunity to

request a reconsideration by the decision-making body.
4. Written Reasons. If the faculty member expresses a desire to petition
the grievance committee..., or any other appropriate committee, to use its
good offices of inquiry, recommendation, and report, or if the request is
made for any other reason satisfactory to the faculty member alone, the
reasons given in explanation of the nonrenewal should be confirmed in
writing.

5. Petition for Review Alleging an Academic Freedom Violation or
Improper Discrimination.

Insofar as the petition for review alleges a
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a. De Facto Tenure
As previously explained, a nontenured faculty member does not have a
property interest in her position. °5
In a limited number of cases, the courts have required that colleges and
universities provide even nontenured faculty members with procedural due
process prior to dismissal.
These cases normally involve unusual
circumstances, as evidenced by Perry v. Sindermann."6
The case involved a professor, Sindermann, who was employed by
Odessa Junior College under successive one-year contracts. After ten years
of employment, Sindermann's contract was not renewed. Sindermann filed
an action claiming that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom
of expression, association, petition, and due process had been violated. Prior

violation of academic freedom or improper discrimination, the functions of
the committee that reviews the faculty member's petition should be the
following:
(a) To determine whether or not the notice of nonreappointment
constitutes on its face a violation of academic freedom or improper
discrimination.
(b) To seek to settle the matter by informal methods.
(c) If the matter remains unresolved, to decide whether or not the
evidence submitted in support of the petition warrants a
recommendation that a formal proceeding be conducted in accordance
with [appropriate institutional regulations], with the burden of proof
resting upon the complaining faculty member.
6. Petition for Review Alleging Inadequate Consideration. Insofar as the
petition for review alleges inadequate consideration, the functions of the
committee which reviews the faculty member's petition should be the
following:
(a) To determine whether the decision ofthe appropriate faculty body
was the result of adequate consideration, with the understanding that
the review committee should not substitute its judgment on the merits
for that of the faculty body;
(b) To request reconsideration by the faculty body when the committee
believes that adequate consideration was not given to the faculty member's
qualifications (in such instances, the committee should indicate the respects
in which it believes that consideration may have been inadequate);
(c) To provide copies of its report and recommendation to the faculty
member, the faculty body, and the president or other appropriate
administrative officer.
76 ACADEME: BULLETIN OF THE AAUP 48 (1990) reprinted in AAUP, POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 15 (1990).

205. See generally infra part III.A.l.a.
206. 408 U.S. 593 (1972); see supra part III.A.l.b.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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to his dismissal, Sindermann was not notified of any charges against him and
was not given an opportunity to be heard.2 7
Both the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals20 8 and the United States
Supreme Cour 9 remanded the case to the lower court for additional
findings as to Sindermann's claims in light of the institution's policies and
practices which created an expectancy of continued employment. 0 The
institution had created a de facto interest for Sindermann in the employment
relationship.
Procedural due process cases such as Perry are analogous to the
substantive due process cases previously discussed, wherein a property right
was created through a faculty manual or some other means which engendered
an expectancy of continued employment.2 ' Unless the court has some basis
for finding a de facto property right created by the words or deeds of an
institution's administration, there is no basis for Fourteenth Amendment claims
of substantive or procedural due process.2"
b. Liberty Interest
Even if a nontenured faculty member lacks a property interest in her
position, her dismissal or disciplining may give rise to a liberty interest
requiring she be provided procedural due process before any action is taken
against her. The U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v.
Roth"' identifies when a liberty interest is implicated.
In Roth, an assistant professor of political science claimed a denial of his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when his contract of employment was
not renewed. He did not receive an explanation or a hearing on the
action.21 4 In reversing a lower court decision in the professor's favor, the

207. Perry, 408 U.S. at 595.
208. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
209. Perry, 408 U.S. at 603.
210. Id.
211. See supraIII.A.l.b.
212. Even where procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is not
an issue, an institution of higher learning must follow its own established procedures.
In Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), a professor
who was denied tenure was able to force the university to reconsider her tenure
application. Although she failed to properly raise her claims of violations of
substantive and procedural due process, she did establish that the university had used
improper procedures in denying her tenure and had acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. Id at 919 and n.1.
213. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
214. Id.
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Supreme Court held that Roth, as a nontenured professor, did not have a
constitutional right to either an explanation for his discharge or to a hearing.
Due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is involved only
where a person has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest,
which Roth, as a nontenured professor, did not possess.2 15
According to the Supreme Court, essential liberty rights arise "where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity are at stake because of
what his government is doing to him," or where the state "imposed a stigma
or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities."216
The Court found that Roth was not
stigmatized because of his dismissal without a notice of charges and a hearing:
"It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of liberty
when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains free to seek
, 217
another. n

Not all negative information provided as to a faculty member implicates
a liberty interest. The information must involve allegations of dishonesty,
moral turpitude, criminal activity, or serious character defects," 8 and the
statements must be false.219 In addition, the stigmatizing information must
foreclose other employment opportunities.2" The courts have recognized
the following statements regarding faculty as stigmatizing remarks which give
rise to a liberty interest: abuse of students, alcoholism, criminal conduct,
dishonesty, inability to get along with others or hostility toward authority,
mental or emotional illness or instability, improper personal behavior outside
of the classroom, racism, sexual misconduct, suicidal tendencies, theft, and
unethical conduct.22
But not all negative information about an employee is sufficiently
stigmatizing to give rise to a liberty interest and the courts are not always
consistent in what information they consider to be stigmatizing. Courts have
failed to find the following comments sufficient to raise a liberty interest:
dress or appearance, reduction in work force due to economics, general
concerns about an employee, hostile attitude, immoral behavior, incompetence,
ineffectiveness, insubordination, problems in teaching, profanity, poor

215. Id. at 564.

216. Id at 573.
217. Id. at 575 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-896

(1960)).
218. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-308.
219. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-308.
220. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-308.
221. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-308-10 nn.238-249.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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judgment, problems in relationships with students, strike and union activities,
and unprofessional conduct.'
But even in those cases where stigmatizing comments are made about an
employee, no liberty interest is raised unless the information is made public
or "likely to be disseminated widely enough to damage the discharged
employee's standing in the community or foreclose future job
opportunities."2 "5
2. Tenured Faculty
While the courts have frequently allowed colleges and universities to
dismiss nontenured faculty without complying with procedural due process,
such is not the case once tenure has been granted. Procedural due process is
critical to protecting a public institution's faculty from arbitrary
dismissals.'2 4 This is largely due to the property interest a teacher possesses
in continued employment after tenure has been granted. Prior to termination
of employment, the tenured faculty member has the right to be fully informed
of the reasons for dismissal. A hearing must be provided, wherein the charges
are more fully stated, and the professor is given an opportunity to challenge
their sufficiency.'2
But even this constitutionally protected right can be waived by an
individual. It can also be waived on behalf of an individual by a collective
unit. An example of such a waiver is Antinore v. State of New
bargaining
6
York."
In Antinore, a tenured public employee was suspended without pay
pending removal proceedings on charges of misconduct. The employee
contended that the collective bargaining agreement illegally denied him a
presuspension hearing. The court held that parties to a collective bargaining
agreement can waive constitutionally guaranteed rights and procedures and
establish dispute resolution procedures that do not provide employees with full
constitutional protection." 7

222. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-310.2-.4 nn.266-80.
223. RAPP, supra note 3, at 6-310 (citing Brandt v. Board of Co-op. Educ. Servs.,
820 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) [Brandt 1], sub. opinion, 845 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1988)

[Brandt I1]).
224. Olswang & Fantel, supra note 45, at 5.
225. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).

226. 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 558 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y.
1976).
227. 1d.; Matthew W. Finkin, 'A Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace:"
Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practicesand Law, 53
LAw & CONTEwM. PROBS. 357 (Summer 1990); William H. Daughtrey, Jr., The Legal
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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However, unless the procedural due process requirements for tenured
faculty have been clearly waived, the procedures must be strictly complied
with before any adverse employment action can be taken against the tenured
faculty member. Failure to comply with procedural due process requirements
can result in an immediate reversal of any action taken by the institution
against the faculty member." 8

Nature ofAcademic Freedom In United States Colleges and Universities,25 U. RICH.
L. REv. 233 (1991); Thomas Grexa, Title VII Tenure Litigation in the Academy and
Academic Freedom-A Current Appraisal, 96 DICK L. REv. 11 (1991).
228. The AAUP recommends the following Statement of Procedural Standards
in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings to protect the rights of tenured faculty members:
1. PreliminaryProceedingsConcerningthe Fitness of a Faculty Member
When reasons arise to question the fitness of a college or university faculty
member who has tenure or whose term of appointment has not expired, the
appropriate administrative officers should ordinarily discuss the matter with
the faculty member in personal conference. The matter may be terminated
by mutual consent at this point; but if an adjustment does not result, a
standing or ad hoc committee elected by the faculty and charged with the
function of rendering confidential advice in such situations should
informally inquire into the situation, to effect an adjustment if possible, and,
if none is effected to determine whether in its view formal proceedings to
consider the faculty member's dismissal should be instituted. If the
committee recommends that such proceedings should be begun, or if the
president of the institution, even after considering a recommendation of the
committee favorable to the faculty member, expresses the conviction that
a proceeding should be undertaken, action should be commenced under the
procedures which follow. Except where there is disagreement, a statement
with reasonable particularity of the grounds proposed for the dismissal
should then be jointly formulated by the president and the faculty
committee; if there is disagreement, the president or the president's
representative should formulate the statement.
2. Commencement of FormalProceedings
The formal proceedings should be commenced by a communication
addressed to the faculty member by the president of the institution,
informing the faculty member of the statement formulated, and informing
the faculty member that, at the faculty member's request, a hearing to
determine whether he or she should be removed from the faculty position
on the grounds stated will be conducted by a faculty committee at a
specified time and place. In setting the date of the hearing, sufficient time
should be allowed the faculty member to prepare a defense. The faculty
member should be informed, in detail or by reference to published
regulations, of the procedural rights that will be accorded. The faculty
member should state in reply whether he or she wishes a hearing, and, if
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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so, should answer in writing, not less than one week before the date set for
the hearing, the statements in the president's letter.
3. Suspension of the FacultyMember
Suspension of the faculty member during the proceedings is justified only
if immediate harm to the faculty member or others is threatened by the
faculty member's continuance. Unless legal considerations forbid, any such
suspension should be with pay.
4. HearingCommittee
The committee of faculty members to conduct the hearing and reach a
decision should either be an elected standing committee not previously
concerned with the case or a committee established as soon as possible after
the president's letter to the faculty member has been sent. The choice of
members of the hearing committee should be on the basis of their
objectivity and competence and of the regard in which they are held in the
academic community. The committee should elect its own chair.
5. Committee Proceeding
The committee should proceed by considering the statement of grounds for
dismissal already formulated, and the faculty member's response written
before the time of the hearing. If the faculty member has not requested a
hearing, the committee should consider the case on the basis of the
obtainable information and decide whether the faculty member should be
removed; otherwise the hearing should go forward. The committee, in
consultation with the president and the faculty member, should exercise its
judgment as to whether the hearing should be public or private. If any facts
are in dispute, the testimony of witnesses and other evidence concerning the
matter set forth in the president's letter to the faculty member should be
received.
The president should have the option of attendance during the hearing. The
president may designate an appropriate representative to assist in developing
the case; but the committee should determine the order of proof, should
normally conduct the questioning of witnesses, and, if necessary, should
secure the presentation of evidence important to the case.
The faculty member should have the option of assistance by counsel, whose
functions should be similar to those of the representative chosen by the
president. The faculty member should have the additional procedural rights
set forth in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, and should have the aid of the committee, which needed, in
securing the attendance of witnesses. The faculty member or the faculty
member's counsel and the representative designated by the president should
have the right, within reasonable limits, to question all witnesses who testify
orally. The faculty member should have the opportunity to be confronted
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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by all adverse witnesses. Where unusual and urgent reasons move the
hearing committee to withhold this right, or where the witness cannot
appear, the identity of the witness, as well as the statements of the witness,
should nevertheless be disclosed to the faculty member. Subject to these
safeguards, statements may when necessary be taken outside the hearing and
reported to it. All of the evidence should be duly recorded. Unless special
circumstances warrant, it should not be necessary to follow formal rules of
court procedure.
6. Considerationby HearingCommittee
The committee should reach its'decision in conference, on the basis of the
hearing. Before doing so, it should give opportunity to the faculty member
or the faculty member's counsel and the representative designated by the
president to argue orally before it. If written briefs would be helpful, the
committee may request them. The committee may proceed to decision
promptly, without having the record of the hearing transcribed, where it
feels that a just decision can be reached by this means; or it may await the
availability of a transcript of the hearing if its decision would be aided
thereby. It should make explicit findings with respect to each of the
grounds of removal presented, and a reasoned opinion may be desirable.
Publicity concerning the committee's decision may properly be withheld
until consideration has been given to the case by the governing body of the
institution. The president and the faculty member should be notified of the
decision in writing and should be given a copy of the record of the hearing.
Any release to the public should be made through the president's office.
7. Considerationby GoverningBody
The president should transmit to the governing body the full report of the
hearing committee, stating its action. On the assumption that the governing
board has accepted the principle of the faculty hearing committee,
acceptance of the committee's decision would normally be expected. If the
governing body chooses to review the case, its review should be based on
the record of the previous hearing, accompanied by opportunity for
argument, oral or written or both, by the principals at the hearing or their
representatives. The decision of the hearing committee should either be
sustained or the proceeding be returned to the committee with objections
specified. In such a case the committee should reconsider, taking account
of the stated objections and receiving new evidence if necessary. It should
frame its decision and communicate it in the same manner as before. only
after study of the committee's reconsideration should the governing body
make a final decision overruling the committee.
8. Publicity
Except for such simple announcements as may be required, covering the
time of the hearing and similar matters, public statements about the case by
either the faculty member or administrative officers should be avoided as
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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C. Other Constitutionaland Statutory Challenges
While the success of substantive and procedural due process claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment are dependent upon whether the claimant has a
vested property right or liberty interest, such is not the case as to other
constitutional and statutory challenges to the legality of performance reviews.
With increasing frequency, faculty members who are denied continued
employment, salary increases, promotion, or tenure are basing their complaints
on grounds other than substantive or procedural due process claims. The
following constitutes the more prevalent claims being made today. These
claims are not dependent upon the existence of vested property rights and
claimants are finding that the courts are much more receptive to hearing these
cases on their merits.
1. First Amendment Claims (Free Speech)
Regardless of whether a faculty member has obtained tenure, a state
employee cannot be discharged, or denied promotion, for any reason that
intrudes on the employee's First Amendment right to free speech.229 Before
the protection of the First Amendment can be invoked, it must be
demonstrated that the employee was engaged in constitutionally protected
speech. The parameters of what constitutes constitutionally protected speech
are set out in the case of Pickeringv. Board of Education. °
In Pickering,the United States Supreme Court delineated between speech
protected by the First Amendment from retaliatory actions of employers and
that speech which is not protected by the Constitution. A teacher wrote a
letter to a newspaper criticizing the Board of Education's allocation of school
funds and, in particular, the school superintendent's failure to disclose the
reason why additional tax revenues were needed. This public criticism led to
the teacher's dismissal."' The Supreme Court held that the teacher's First
Amendment rights were violated by her dismissal because she spoke out on
matters of legitimate public concern. 32

far as possible until the proceedings have been completed. Announcement
of the final decision should include a statement of the hearing committee's
original action, if this has not previously been made known.
76 ACADEME: BULLETIN OF THE AAUP 42 (1990).

229. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1986); Rutan v. Republican Party
of I11. 497 U.S. 62, 62 (1990).
230. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
231. Id. at 566-67, 575-78.
232. Id. at 571.
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Pickeringextends First Amendment protection to employees who speak
on matters of public concern, but denies it to those who address matters of
purely personal interest. What constitutes a matter of public concern can only
be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement as
revealed by the whole record. 3 Absent the most unusual circumstances,
federal courts will not review the wisdom of personnel decisions taken against
employees who speak out not as citizens upon matters of public concern, but
instead as employees upon matters of purely personal interest. 4
Regardless of the doctrine of academic freedom and First Amendment
claims and tenure rights, faculty members of state supported colleges and
universities are public employees and their institutions are public employers.
In determining a public employee's rights of free speech, a balance must be
struck between the interests of the employee as a citizen commenting on
matters of public concern and the state's interest as an employer in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 5
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment decisions,
then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively
and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest
when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.
The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in the
name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for
the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may
well be appropriate. 6
The government as employer has far greater power in restricting
employees' speech than does the government as sovereign.2 7 Examples of
restrictions government as employer may place on employees' speech include
barring employees from being rude to customers, barring employees from
making offensive or vulgar utterances to the public or coworkers, prohibiting
an employee from counseling her coworkers to do their jobs contrary to

233. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (assistant district attorney's
constitutionally protected right of free speech was not violated when she was
discharged after circulating an intra-office questionnaire concerning office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, and level of confidence in
supervisors).
234. Coyne v. City of Somerville, 770 F. Supp. 740 (D. Mass. 1991).
235. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
236. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994).
237. Id. at 1886 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Civil Service Comm'n v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973), supersededby statute as stated in Bavers
v. Comett, 865 F.2d 1517 (8th Cir. 1989); Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1
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management's instructions, and firing an employee for criticizing
management's policies. 8
Even constitutionally protected speech can be a legitimate basis for
denying tenure or even disciplining a tenured faculty member. A professor
whose speech constantly disrupts the harmony of a university and which
destroys the collegiality of a department could find that conduct forms a basis
for the termination of employment or disciplinary action." 9 A few courts
have gone so far as to conclude that remarks which are merely disruptive, or
constitute "hate speech," are not entitled to First Amendment protection.24 °
Parate v. Isibor24' is an excellent example of the application of the
balancing test established in Pickering. The case revolved around a conflict
between Natthu S. Parate, a nontenured associate professor in the engineering
department of Tennessee State University (TSU), Edward I. Isibor, TSU's
dean of the School of Engineering and Technology, and Michael Samuchin,
who served as head of the Department of Engineering.242
In his first semester at TSU, Parate taught the course "Groundwater and
Seepage." Under the course's grading scale, students who earned ninety to
one hundred percent of the total classroom points received an "A" grade and
students who earned eighty to ninety percent received a grade of "B." Parate
also had a policy of upgrading an individual student's grade in light of an
individual student's extenuating circumstances. Two students, identified as X
and Y, received grades of eighty-six in Parate's class. The grade of Student
X was raised from B to A because Student X had been involved in a serious
legal matter during the course. Parate refused, however, to raise the grade of
Student Y because Student Y cheated on the final examination. Student Y had
also presented false medical excuses as to his class absences.243

238. See generally Churchill,114 S. Ct. at 1886 and cases cited therein; Damrot
v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (coach's locker room
speech in which he used racial epithets was not on a matter of public concern, and thus
the university's decision not to renew his employment contract did not violate the First
Amendment).
239. Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1981); but see Levin v. Harleston,
770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (free speech and tenure rights of professor who
expressed controversial views on blacks and the commission of crimes were violated
when college: (1) created shadow sections to which students were encouraged to
switch; (2) created ad hoe committee of faculty to investigate professor's writings and
not his conduct), modified, 966 F.2d. 85 (1992).
240. See Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa. at Ind., 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3rd Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
241. 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989).
242. Id
243. Id. at 823-24.
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Student Y, a Nigerian, told Parate that he would get Dean Isibor, a fellow
Nigerian, to change the grade. After Student Y contacted Isibor, the dean
began pressuring Parate to change Student Y's grade to an A. Isibor
instructed Parate to change the grade and to prepare a memorandum to the
effect that course grading distribution had been changed to make eighty-six an
A. Parate refused and Isibor insulted Parate by questioning his teaching
ability and where Parate got his degree. The department head, Samuchin, also
began to pressure Parate to change Student Y's grade and Parate finally gave
in, especially because he feared future reprisals from Isibor.2"
Even after Parate changed Student Y's grade, Samuchin and Isibor
harassed Parate. They challenged Parate's grading criteria in other courses,
sent letters critical of his teaching methods, and gave him low performance
evaluations. Parate was even denied authorization for professional travel and
appropriate reimbursements." 5
On a number of occasions Isibor and Samuchin interrupted a class taught
by Parate and criticized Parate in front of the students. Isibor went so far as
to take over the instruction of a class and to order Parate to attend the class
as a student. 4 6
Parate was eventually dismissed from his position at TSU. He filed an
action against Isibor and Samuchin, individually and in their official
capacities, as well as against TSU and the Board of Regents of the State
University and Community College system of Tennessee.247 In his cause of
action, Parate asserted claims for violations of his right to academic freedom
under the First Amendment, and his liberty and due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, he filed state claims for defamation,
interference with his property right to work, retaliatory discharge, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Parate sought preliminary and
injunctive relief, as well as damages. 248 The district court eventually
dismissed all of Parate's claims and granted the defendants' motions for
summary judgment.249
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling except as to Parate's claim that his First Amendment rights had been
violated when he was forced to change Student Y's grade from B to A. As
to that issue, the appellate court remanded the case for a determination of

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id. (Parate brought his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See infra part

III.C.2.b.
248. Parate,868 F.2d at 825-26.
249. Id. at 826.
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damages and whether Parate was discharged due to the exercise of his First
Amendment right to academic freedom."
In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit stressed that United States public
education is committed to the control of local and state authorities. As a
result, courts cannot intervene to resolve educational conflicts that do not
"'
involve basic constitutional values.25
In Parate's case, the court found that most of the actions taken against
Parate by Isibor and Samuchin did not violate constitutional values. As a
nontenured faculty member, his classroom activities were subject to review in
determining whether to grant or deny tenure. TSU was free not to renew
Parate's contract as a nontenured professor if his pedagogical attitude and
teaching methods failed to conform to institutional standards. The court held
that the First Amendment concept of academic freedom does not require that
a nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto himself. Possibly even more
importantly, the court noted that a university may dismiss a nontenured
professor for any reason, or no reason, and the professor has no recourse
unless the dismissal abridges a constitutionally protected right.252
Although the court found Isibor and Samuchin's disruption of Parate's
classes to be unprofessional, their conduct did not violate Parate's First
Amendment right as they were free to attend, observe, and criticize the way
Parate conducted his classes. 3 Also, the removal of Parate as the teacher
in a specific class did not violate his substantive due process rights because he
had no constitutional right to teach a specific class.254 The decision not to
renew Parate's contract also was not actionable because he was a nontenured
professor and had no property interest in his job. The court also noted that
Parate was not being denied a choice of career given that he could seek
employment at another university. 5
As to forcing Parate to change Student Y's grade, however, the court held
that Parate's First Amendment rights had been violated. The assignment of
a letter grade is symbolic communication which sends a specific message to
the student as to the student's skills, ability, and knowledge. The freedom to
assign grades is of substantial importance to a professor and is entitled to
protection under the First Amendment. 6

250. Id at 833.

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 830 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
Id at 827.
Id at 830-31.
Id at 832; see also Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1976).
255. Parate,868 F.2d at 831; see also infra part III.A.l.a.
256. Parate,868 F.2d at 827-28.
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Another good example of the overlap of academic freedom and the First
Amendment is Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College.257 Cohen, a
tenured professor, taught English and film studies at San Bernardino Valley
College (SBVC). He also taught a remedial English class. 8
In his English course, Cohen admittedly used a confrontational style of
teaching designed to "shock" his students into thinking and writing about
controversial subjects. He assigned provocative essays, including Jonathan
Swift's "A Modest Proposal." Cohen brought up such subjects as obscenity,
with children. He often used vulgarities and
cannibalism, and consensual 2sex
9
classroom.
his
in
profanities
During one of his English classes, Cohen read aloud some articles from
Hustler and Playboy. At the end of class he assigned to his students the task
of writing essays defining pornography. One female student, Murillo, asked
for an alternative assignment, but Cohen refused her request. 6 '
Murillo stopped attending the English class and received a failing grade
for the semester. Murillo filed a complaint with the English department
asserting that Cohen had sexually harassed her. According to Murillo, in
addition to the frequent use of profanity and sexual topics in the class, Cohen
would look down Murillo's shirt and the shirts of other female students. She
also claimed that Cohen offered to help her get a better grade if Murillo would
"'
meet him in a bar.26
The SBVC Faculty Grievance Committee held a hearing to determine the
validity of Murillo's complaint. After hearing witnesses called by Murillo and
Cohen and reviewing relevant documents, the Committee found that Cohen
had violated the Community College District's policy against sexual
harassment by creating a hostile learning environment. 22 The Committee
recommended to the district's president that disciplinary action be taken
against Cohen. 63
The president concurred with the Committee's findings and Cohen
appealed the decisions to the San Bernardino Community College Board of
Trustees ("Board"). The Board upheld the previous two decisions and as
disciplinary action ordered Cohen to:

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

883 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
Id. at 1410.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at n.4.
Id.
at 1411.
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Provide a syllabus concerning his teaching style, purpose, content, and

method to his students at the beginning of class and to the department chair
by certain deadlines;

2.

Attend a sexual harassment seminar within ninety days;

3.

Undergo a formal evaluation procedure in accordance with the

collective bargaining agreement; and,
4.

Become more sensitive to the particular needs and backgrounds of his

students, and to modify his teaching strategy when it becomes apparent that
his techniques
create a climate which impedes the students' ability to
24
learn. 6
Cohen responded by filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against SBVC's
Board, chancellor, president, his department head, and members of the Faculty
Grievance Committee. The § 1983 claims were dismissed by the district court
on the grounds of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.265
The court did consider Cohen's assertion that SBVC's sexual harassment
policy violated the free speech provisions of the First Amendment.2" He
further argued that his right to academic freedom prevented SBVC from
punishing him for his classroom behavior.267
The court ruled against Cohen and held that SBVC's sexual harassment
policy did not violate Cohen's First Amendment rights or impinge on
academic freedom. In its decision, the court noted that the rhetoric in cases
upholding academic freedom is often broader than the holdings. Many cases
restrict the government from regulating the nonclassroom conduct of teachers,
such as those cases striking loyalty oath requirements, attempting to punish
teachers for so-called "treasonable" or "seditious" words or actions, or
268
attempting to speak out on matters of public concern.
As to classroom conduct, the courts have protected the rights of teachers
and placed restrictions on the state's control of classroom discussion, but only
to a limited extent. For example, the use of an obscenity for demonstrated
educational purposes, the discussion of controversial topics, or the assignment

264. Id.
265. Id.; A detailed explanation of § 1983 claims and the immunity doctrine can
be found infra parts III.C.2.b.1.-2.
266. Id Cohen also claimed that the policy violated the free speech provisions

found in the California Constitution. Id. at 1412 n.6.
267. Id. at 1412.

268. Id. at 1412 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (loyalty oaths or attempts to force teachers

to disclose their allegiance to "subversive" groups)); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (unconstitutionally vague statute forbid "treasonable" or
"seditious" words)).
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of a controversial novel are all rights protected by academic freedom and
sometimes by the First Amendment as well.269
But the courts have not ceded all classroom control to teachers. The
courts have repeatedly held that colleges and universities have broad control
over such core concerns as course content, homework, and grading
Courts have also found that colleges and universities retain
policies.
substantial control over pedagogical methods."
The court concluded that Cohen's invocation of academic freedom did
not adequately address the case's complex issues. It therefore refused to hold
SBVC's disciplinary action violative of academic freedom. 72
In scrutinizing Cohen's First Amendment claims, the court quickly
dismissed Cohen's claim of the right to use profanity. The court held that
profanity is not speech on a matter of public concern and therefore is not
protected by the First Amendment. 3
The court took a different view, however, as to Cohen's assignment of
sexually focused topics and his commentary on those topics. The court found
such actions and words to relate to matters of public concern. As a result,
SBVC had the duty to show that its legitimate interests outweighed Cohen's
First Amendment interests.27 4
This balancing test requires a court to consider the manner, time, place,
and context of the offending expressions, along with "whether the statement
impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty
and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's
duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise." 75
In applying the balancing test to Cohen's conduct and speech, the court
found that SBVC had brought forth substantial, uncontroverted evidence
269. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1414 (citing Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362
(1st Cir. 1969) (use of obscene words)); Dube v. State Univ., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2nd
Cir. 1990) (controversial topics), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 (M.D. Ala. 1970)).
270. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1413 (citing Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts
Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 424 (1st Cir. 1986)); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1986).
271. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1414 (citing Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708-09
(6th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 1075 (1973)); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931-32
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,411 U.S. 972 (1973)). Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir. 1991).
272. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1414.
273. Id at 1416.
274. Id at 1417.

275. Id at 1417 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73
(1968)).
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establishing that Cohen had disrupted the educational process."
Furthermore, his methods, while effective as to some students, had created a
hostile learning environment which hampered the learning process for other
students.2 The court concluded that the restrictions placed on Cohen by
SBVC were not onerous.278
A controversial case decided in 1994 by the Second Circuit Court of
2 79
Appeals, Jeffries v. Harleston,
has clarified the issue of when an
institution of higher education can discipline a tenured professor for the
professor's public remarks without violating the professor's academic freedom
or First Amendment rights.
Professor Jeffries was chairperson of the black studies department at City
College of New York ("City College"), which is part of the City University
of New York ("CUNY") system. In the summer of 1991 he was the keynote
speaker at an off-campus symposium on black culture. In speaking on
perceived bias in New York State's public school curriculum, Jeffries made
several derogatory remarks about Jews. 2 ' As a result of the speech and the
controversy it ignited, CUNY officials voted to reduce Jeffries' term as
department chairperson to one year, even though the normal term was three
28
years. '
Jeffries brought suit against the university officials alleging that his First
Amendment rights had been violated.282 Jeffries sought reinstatement and
punitive damages. 3
Based on the jury's answers to interrogatories, the trial court judge
concluded that university officials had violated Jeffries' First Amendment
rights because his speech was substantially on matters of public concern and
did not harm the university.8 4 In addition to ordering Jeffries to be
reinstated as chairperson, the court awarded Jeffries $360,000 in punitive
damages.285
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order to
reinstate Jeffries, but vacated the punitive damages award because of the jury's

276. Id. at 1418.
277. Id. at 1419.
278. Id. at 1420.
279. 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 21
F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994), on
remand, 52 F.3d 9 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995).
280. Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 11.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.; Jefflies also claimed a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 11.
Id.
Id.; See also the lengthy trial court's opinion at 828 F. Supp. 1066.
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inconsistent responses to the special verdict questions regarding punitive
damages. The case was remanded for trial on the issue of punitive
damages.286
The United States Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case with
instruction to the court to reconsider its opinion in light of the Supreme
287
Court's decision in Waters v. Churchill.
In Waters, a four-justice plurality held that the government could fire an
employee for disruptive speech even where there was no proof of actual
injury. Instead, the government need only prove that the speech threatened to
interfere with government operations.288
The Second Circuit interpreted the Waters plurality opinion to hold that
"the closer the employee's speech reflects on matters of public concern, the
greater must be the employer's showing that the speech is likely to be
disruptive before it may be punished. 289 But Waters does permit the
government to fire an employee for speaking on a matter of public concern
if: "(1) the employer's prediction of disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential
disruptiveness is enough to outweigh the value of the speech; and (3) the
employer took action against the employee based on this disruption and not
in retaliation for the speech.""g
The court concluded that Jeffries' First Amendment rights were not
violated because those university officials who voted to reduce Jeffries' term
as chairperson did so because they reasonably expected that his speech would
harm the university.29 ' In addition, Jeffries' academic freedom was not
violated because the position of chairperson at CIJNY is ministerial and
provided no greater contact with the public than an ordinary
professorship.292 The university had made no effort to silence Jeffries, to
limit his access to the marketplace of ideas in the classroom, or to affect his
status as a tenured professor.293

286. Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 11-12; see also Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 124950 (2d Cir. 1994).
287. Jeffries, 52 F.3d at 12.
288. Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887, 1890 (1994)).
289. Id. at 13.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 14.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 14, 15.
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2. Discrimination Claims
An ever burgeoning body of federal and state laws and regulations
prohibits certain types of discrimination in such personnel decisions as hiring,
firing, discipline, promotion, and compensation.294 These laws place an ever
greater premium upon institutions being able to justify their personnel
decisions and to clearly demonstrate that the decisions were made in
accordance with legally permissible criteria and procedures. Many of the
personnel litigation cases taking place in education today are rooted in such
statutes which prohibit discrimination. These cases can be brought regardless
of whether a faculty member has obtained a vested property right in her
employment. The following is a brief summary of some federal legislation
which is particularly applicable to higher education and the personnel
decision-making process.
a. Title VII In General
Of all the statutes prohibiting employment discrimination, probably the
most significant is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.295
Certainly, the majority of civil rights claims are filed under Title VII. Title
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any person as to hiring,
firing, discipline, promotion, and compensation on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.296 Title VII originally excluded educational
institutions from its coverage. This exemption, however, was repealed in
1972.297
A Title VII violation can be proven by the presentation of direct

evidence. In a tenure case, for example, direct evidence can be used to
establish that the votes of specific members of the decision-making body were
influenced adversely by the tenure applicant's race or national origin.298

294. RAPP, supra note 3, § 6.04(1) (6-34.3).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 Supp. V 1993).

296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 Supp. V 1993).
297. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, amending the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-16 (1988 Supp. V 1993). See also, Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 550 (3d Cir. 1980); Title VII does contain an
exemption applicable to educational institutions with strong religious affiliations. An
educational institution may employ persons of a particular religion if the institution is
"in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1988 Supp. V 1993).
298. Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1151

(D. Mass. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
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Evidentiary examples of discrimination could consist of racial epithets made
by tenure board members or remarks of racial stereotyping. The faculty
member denied tenure must still establish causation showing that race or
national origin was a determinative factor in the negative employment
decision. He must also be able to prove he would have been voted tenure
except for discrimination against his race or national origin.299
Title VII violations can also be proven by circumstantial evidence. For
example, if a tenure committee had a history of denying tenure to qualified
African-American applicants, while granting tenure to less qualified white
applicants, then in an individual case of denying tenure to a qualified AfricanAmerican it seems more likely than not that the applicant was rejected because
of race."
Although Title VII applies to discrimination based on race and religion
as well as sex, claims of sex discrimination now constitute a fertile area of
litigation in the tenure and promotion process, especially under claims of
disparate impact. Sex discrimination consists of imposing barriers to
employment which affect one gender but not the other. A form of sex
discrimination recently recognized by the Supreme Court is "hostile
environment" sexual harassment. This form of discrimination arises when sex
discrimination becomes sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter
the conditions
30
of employment and create an abusive working environment."
In the past, some courts followed a hands off policy as to educational
institutions and personnel decisions, even where claims of sex discrimination
were made. Such courts followed the long established doctrine that they
should not substitute their judgments for those of the academic evaluators, so
long as judgments are made in accordance with prescribed procedures.3"
Today, however, courts are increasingly less inclined to take a hands off
approach regarding sex discrimination claims in education, especially where
highly subjective criteria are used in the evaluation process. As a result, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) found reasonable cause
to believe that a medical school's tenure program, which used highly
subjective criteria and was applied almost exclusively by male faculty
members, discriminated against female faculty members in violation of Title

299. Id.
300. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See generally
infra part III.C.2.a., for a discussion of the analytical framework in circumstantial
evidence cases of discrimination.
301. RAPP, supranote 3, at § 6.04[2][h] (citing Merito Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)); See also Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994); Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).
302. EEOC v. Tufts Instit. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.C. Mass. 1975);
Johnson v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1354 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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VII. The Commission described the criteria set out in the faculty handbook
3 3
as "amorphous.""
The EEOC also found that a university's tenure process discriminated
against females because the evaluation process was too dependent upon
subjective evaluations. The criteria for tenure and promotion included:
knowledge of subject matter, ability to communicate, organization and
planning, self-criticism and improvement, interest in the students, professional
development, research and writing, "the Life of the Mind," service to the
university, and Christian faith and professional life.3
Of course, not all claims of sex discrimination are legitimate claims.
Female faculty members who are incompetent or lack adequate teaching or
research skills are no more entitled to tenure or promotion than their male
colleagues with similar deficiencies.0 s In one case, a female faculty
member's continued disagreements with members of the academic community
and refusal to accept valid teaching assignments constituted sufficient grounds
to deny her tenure."
There are two common forms of discrimination that an employer can be
guilty of committing under Title VII in using performance evaluations. Each
form is distinguished by the way in which the discriminatory conduct is
implemented.
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment is an employer's intentional treatment of some
persons less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of a discriminatory nature is demonstrated by a
showing that the employment practice in issue (e.g., hiring, pay scale,
promotion) is deliberate and not accidental. 0 7 In Title VII cases, the
complainant has the burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination in employment. In a disparate treatment case, this means only
that the complainant must demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a class of
persons protected by Title VII; (2) is qualified for the position sought or, if
already an employee, is entitled to a pay increase or promotion; (3) is rejected
despite the qualifications; and (4) the employer sought applications from, or

303. EEOC Decision No. 74-53 (Nov. 12, 1973), EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
6410, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 460.
304. Biruta Cap v. Lehigh Univ., 450 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
305. See Lieberman v. Gant, 474 F. Supp 848 (C.D.C. Conn. 1979); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
306. Perham v. Ladd, 436 F. Supp 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
307. RAPP,supra note 3, at § 6.04[2][i] (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977)).
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rewarded, individuals who possessed no greater qualifications than the
complainant? 8
Disparate treatment cases can be proven by direct evidence of a
discriminatory motive, such as statements made by the person engaging in
unlawful employment acts, or by circumstantial evidence, by comparing the
treatment of the person claiming discrimination with other persons similarly
situated. Finally, statistical evidence showing a pattern or practice of disparate
treatment can be used.3"
a. NondiscriminatoryReason Defense
Once the complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the conduct. If an
employer can demonstrate that, regardless of the discriminatory employment
practice, the same action would have been taken for nondiscriminatory
reasons, an employer can escape an action filed under Title VII.3
In a
number of education cases, employers have been able to establish that,
regardless of certain discriminatory conduct such as nonrenewal of
employment, other legitimate reasons existed for the action."' Even after
the employer articulates such a reason, the complainant may still prevail if she
can demonstrate that the employer's reasons are a mere pretext for
discrimination." 2
A good example of a disparate treatment case involving Title VII
violations, as well as violations of the Equal Pay Act,3" 3 is demonstrated in
the class action lawsuit of Wilkens v. The University of Houston. 14 The
University of Houston established a pay plan for professional and
administrative staff. The plan allocated jobs among nine job levels, with level
one the lowest and level nine the highest. Each job level was assigned a
salary range and each job level was further divided into four pay quartiles,
with the first quartile being the lowest and the fourth quartile the highest. A
salary range was then assigned to each quartile within a job level." 5

308. FED. REG. EMPL. SERV. (Law Co-op), Job Discrimination
309. Perham,436 F. Supp. at 1105.

§ 2:141.

310. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
311. See Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Culver Educ. Found'n, 535 N.E.2d 112
(Ind. 1989); Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 892 (1984); Gray v. Univ of Arkansas, 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989);
Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1989).
312. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
313. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
314. 725 F. Supp. 331 (S.D. Tex. 1989).

315. Id. at 334.
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The plan failed to cure already existing pay inequities between male and
female employees. As a result, a class action lawsuit was filed against the
university by the female employees alleging gender-based discrimination.316
The court found that the female employees established a prima facie case
of employment discrimination which the university failed to successfully
refute. Using statistical analysis, the female employees established that of the
sixty-eight people in the academic division covered under the pay plan, thirtyfour were male and thirty-four were female. Of the sixty-eight persons,
twenty were being paid below the first quartile for their job levels. It was to
be expected that roughly half would be men and half would be women. In
actuality, however, three men and seventeen women were being paid salaries
below the first quartile for the job levels. The complainants proved that the
probability of such gender-based imbalance occurring by chance is four in
10,000. The court held that such a remote possibility eliminated chance as a
factor in explaining the pay disparity and the university failed to rebut the
inference that the disproportion was gender based.31 7
An example of egregious Title VII violations involving sex discrimination
and sexual harassment can be found in Jew v. University of Iowa 8 The
court's decision also explicitly explains the proof necessary in education cases
to establish a discrimination claim.
The plaintiff was a tenured associate professor of medicine at the
University of Iowa and was in the College of Medicine's department of
anatomy. She came to the University of Iowa with the head of the department
of anatomy when he was hired. 9
Faculty members opposed to the department head began a systematic
campaign of sexual harassment against the plaintiff which lasted for thirteen
years. She was falsely accused of having an affair with the department head
Her professional
and of using sex to gain influence with him.
accomplishments were denigrated and rumors were spread that her
320
accomplishments rested on sexual achievements rather than merit.
Sexually suggestive cartoons were posted on the door and wall outside the
plaintiff's laboratory. Faculty members also initiated a pattern of sexually
denigrating speech about the plaintiff and referred to the plaintiff as a "shit,"
"bitch," and "whore" in the presence of faculty, graduate students, and
department staff members.32'

316. Id.
at 334-35.
317. Id.
318. 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990)

319. Id. at 947.
at 947-48.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 948.
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In finding for the plaintiff on her Title VII sexual harassment claim, the
court noted that Title VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible"
discrimination. By using such words as "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment," Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women."
A plaintiff may establish a Title VII
violation by proving that a hostile or abusive work environment was created
because of the plaintiff's sex. To be actionable, the sexual harassment must
be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."3" To prevail in
a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) She belongs to a protected group;
(2) She was subject to unwelcome harassment;
(3) The harassment was based on sex;
(4) The harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and,
(5) The employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take proper remedial action.324
The court concluded that the plaintiff in Jew had proven, by a
preponderance of the evidence, all five elements of her hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim against the University of Iowa.325
The court also held that the evidence supported the plaintiffs claim of
a discriminatory failure to promote.3 26 A failure to promote, or otherwise
reward, a qualified employee because of sex discrimination can be proven by
circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. In a circumstantial
evidence case, courts use the formula articulated in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green.2 7
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff always
retains the burden of proof. The plaintiff must first make a prima facie case
of sex discrimination using a flexible formula tailored to the particular type
of discrimination challenged and the employment decision at issue.328 This
is often accomplished by comparing the plaintiff s academic accomplishments
with those faculty members in comparable positions and length of service who
did receive raises or promotions. Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case,
322. Id.at 957 (citing Monitor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 66, 67
(1986)).
323. Id.at 958.
324. Id.(citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988);
Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F. 2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986)).
325. Jew, 749 F. Supp. at 958.
326. Id.
at 960.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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the employer must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. If an employer states such a reason, the plaintiff must
prove that the purported reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. In
considering the employer's articulated reason and the circumstantial evidence
suggesting a discriminatory motive, the court must determine whether the
employer's explanation is worthy of credence, or if the employer's intent was
discriminatory.329
In a direct evidence case of discriminatory motive relating to an adverse
employment decision, the McDonnell Douglas analysis need not be used.
Instead, courts can apply the "mixed motive" construction set out in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.33 Under the "mixed motive" construction, if the
plaintiff uses direct evidence (e.g., statements of racial or sex bias by those
evaluating the employee for a raise or promotion) to establish discrimination,
the employer must do more than articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse
employment decision. The employer must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the same decision would have been justified and made absent
the discriminatory factors, and that the outcome was not influenced by
discrimination.33'
In Jew, the court found that on several occasions the plaintiff was denied
promotion to full professorship because of the sexual bias of some male
members of the evaluation committee. The plaintiff had been evaluated on the
basis of: (1) her teaching, (2) research and publications, and (3) service to the
institution and the profession. All of the eight evaluators agreed that the
plaintiff had fulfilled the teaching and service criteria. Five of the eight
evaluators, however, voted against promoting the plaintiff because she had not
established her "independence" in the area of research and publications.332

329. Id. (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248
(1981)). In Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1155

(D. Mass. 1980), the court set out a modified version of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis applicable to tenure cases in order to determine whether the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination: "[T]he court concludes that the
elements of a prima facie showing for the case at bar consists of proof of the following
elements: (1) that plaintiff is a member of a racial or national origin minority; (2) that
plaintiff was a candidate for tenure and was qualified under Smith College standards,
practices or customs; (3) that despite his qualifications plaintiff was rejected; and (4)
that tenure positions in the Department of English at Smith College were open at the
time plaintiff was denied tenure in the sense that others were granted tenure in the
department during a period relatively near to the time plaintiff was denied tenure."
330. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), cited in Jew, 749 F. Supp. at 960.
331. Jew, 749 F. Supp. at 960; see Fields v. Clark Univ., 966 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.
1992), for a discussion of the McDonnel Douglas and Price Waterhouse standards.
332. Jew, 749 F. Supp. at 953.
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The sex bias of the five evaluators who voted against the plaintiff was
established by remarks made before and during the evaluation process. Two
of the professors doing the evaluation had previously referred to the plaintiff
as a "whore" and had made other denigrating remarks about the plaintiff.
During the deliberation, other committee members voting against the
plaintiff s promotion commented on the advantages given women and blacks.
The five committee members voting against the plaintiff paid scant attention
to the plaintiffs extensive publication record in prominent research journals
or her record of obtaining grants. Instead, they permitted sex bias to influence
their votes.333
b. Bona Fide OccupationalQualificationDefense
Like any other employer, higher education institutions can raise the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to a disparate treatment claim.
Title VII permits an employer to employ an individual "on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise." ' Obviously, a BFOQ defense will be successful in only very
limited circumstances and can never be used as a defense to racial
discrimination.335 A higher education case in which the BFOQ defense was
successfully used is Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago.336
Loyola University of Chicago is a large Catholic university with a long
tradition in the Roman Catholic religious order of the Society of Jesus, whose
members are more commonly referred to as Jesuits.337
To preserve the Jesuit presence in Loyola's philosophy department,
Loyola decided to replace three retiring tenured faculty members with Jesuit
philosophers and passed a resolution to that effect. 338 Pime, a Jewish man,
who had been employed in Loyola's philosophy department for a number of
years as a part-time lecturer, was informed that a full-time tenure track
position would not be available to him for three or four years because non339
Jesuits would not be considered for the three faculty openings.
Pime filed suit under Title VII claiming religious discrimination. The
district court granted judgment in favor of Loyola after finding that being a

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id
42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(e)(1) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(e)(1) (1994).
803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 352-53.
Id
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Jesuit was a BFOQ. 34 ° On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's ruling.34'
The court held that there was evidence of a relationship between Loyola
and the Society of Jesus and that a Jesuit "presence" was important to the
successful operation of the university: "It appears to be significant to the
educational tradition and character of the institution that students be assured
a degree of contact with teachers who have received the training and accepted
the obligations which are essential to membership in the Society of Jesus. It
requires more to be a Jesuit than just adherence to the Catholic faith, and it
seems wholly reasonable to believe that the educational experience at Loyola
would be different if Jesuit presence were not maintained."342
2. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact discrimination involves employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but fall more harshly on
one group than another. Proof of discriminatory motive is not necessary. To
establish a prima facie case of adverse impact, a victim need only show a
causal connection between the facially neutral employment practice and the
disproportionate exclusion of a protected group from the work force. As in
disparate treatment cases, statistical evidence is commonly used to establish
disparate impact cases.343

In response to a disparate impact claim, the employer must show that the
employment practice is both a business necessity and is job-related. Business
necessity is determined by inquiring into whether the job criteria arise out of
a manifest business need. The job-related standard addresses whether there
is a correlation between the criteria used and job performance."'
An example of an adverse impact case would be an employer's rule that
an "unwed pregnancy" is grounds for termination of employment. Such a rule
obviously does not have the same impact on all employees given that men
cannot get pregnant. It does not even affect all single female employees the
same way because it penalizes only those sexually active female employees
Despite the invidious discriminatory impact,
who become pregnant.

340. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435, 443 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
341. Pime, 803 F.3d at 354.
342. Id. at 353-54 (the court noted that seven of the 31 faculty positions in the
department of Philosophy would be filled by Jesuits).
343. Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1007, 1012
(1994).
344. Id at 1015.
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employers, including educational employers, have at times enacted such a rule
for reasons based on morality, embarrassment, or religious issues.
There are a number of cases involving public schools where school
boards enacted policies requiring the automatic disqualification of unwed
parents from employment in the districts. The policies were all justified on
the grounds that the students should not be exposed to such immoral conduct.
In all of the cases, the policies were stricken by the courts because the courts
found no rational relationship between the "unwed pregnancy" policies and the
normal school operations.345
An interesting disparate impact claim involving an institution of higher
learning can be found in Ray v. Peabody Institute of Johns Hopkins
University, ConservatoryofMuic.346 The Conservatory had a compensation
system under which faculty salaries were affected by students' studio choices.
The more students a professor enrolled and retained in his study, the greater
his salary.347
A black music professor claimed that his studio contained a
disproportionate number of minority-group students. He further argued that
these students were at a greater risk to drop out, thus resulting in a reduction
in the professor's salary. He therefore concluded that the compensation
system, although facially neutral, had a disparate impact on him.348
The court ruled against the professor. It found no evidence of disparate
impact or treatment. Students were free to choose their professors and no
student assignments were made by the Conservatory. Furthermore, the
complaining professor dedicated himself to recruiting minority students for his
studio and should not have been surprised that a disproportionate number of
minority students ended up in his studio.349 Finally, the court characterized
the compensation system as a sound educational policy resulting in salary
reductions for faculty members of diverse races and ages.35
Another example of a disparate impact claim arises out of the case of
EEOC v. Francis W. ParkerSchool.35' The school had a policy of linking
wages to experience. A claim was made that the policy had a disparate impact
on older applicants because their level of experience would command higher

345. Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.Va. 1986);
Avery v. Homewood City Bd. of Educ., 674 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,

461 U.S. 943 (1983); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611
(5th Cir.), cert. granted,423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed,425 U.S. 559 (1976).
346. 11 F.3d 31 (1993).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 34.
350. Id. at 33.
351. 67 F.3d 1470 (7th Cir. 1994).
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salaries than the school's range allowed. It was further contended that the
entire policy was a subterfuge for the belief that older teachers were less
effective than younger teachers. In rejecting the discrimination claim, the
court held that linking wages with experience is an economically feasible and
a reasonable means of determining salaries.35
Examples of promotion and tenure policies which could conceivably have
an adverse impact on certain classes of people would be terminal degree
requirements or requirements that faculty members possess a certain
proficiency in speaking English. Although the terminal degree requirement
would apply to all faculty members, it could have a greater adverse impact on
African-American professors who, because of past discriminatory practices,
may proportionally have fewer terminal degrees than white professors.
Similarly, the English proficiency requirement could have an adverse impact
on foreign born and trained professors for whom English is a secondary
language.
Regardless of the potential adverse impact of such requirements, they are
not unlawful so long as institutions can establish that the requirements arise
out of a business necessity and are job-related.
353 for example, a black
In Scott v. The University of Delaware,
professor unsuccessfully pursued a class action suit on behalf of the
university's black faculty. He claimed that the university's requirement that
tenure candidates hold a terminal degree discriminated against racial minorities
because they were underrepresented as holders of doctoral degrees. The
appellate court, however, upheld the the lower court's ruling that the disparate
impact of the terminal degree requirement was "justified by the legitimate
interest of the university in hiring and advancing persons who are likely to be
successful in adding to the fund of knowledge in their chosen disciplines and
'
effective in the teaching of graduate students in those disciplines."354
b. Sections 1981 and 1983 Claims
As previously seen in this Article in such cases as Siu v. Johnson355 and
Cohen v. San Bernadino College,356 performance evaluations can also give
rise to actions under the civil rights provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983. Although useful in determining the validity of performance evaluations,
both sections have inherent limitations in their application.

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 931 (1979).
See Scott v. Univ. of Del., 455 F. Supp. 1102, 1126 (D.Del. 1978).
See supra part III.A.1.C.
See supra part II.A.
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Section 1981 provides that all persons in the United States shall have the
same rights as "white citizens. 3 57 Section 1981 was passed to address the
problem of the slavery of African-Americans and the vestiges of slavery, but
under its provisions all persons, regardless of race, are protected from racial
discrimination.
In comparison, § 1983 prohibits discrimination not only on the basis of
race, but also as to sex, religion, national origin, or color.358 Section 1983
also prohibits acts of retaliation by employers. Retaliation involves
employment-related decisions which are made on the basis of an employee's
opposition to conduct which may be in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
or on the basis of an employee's participation in a Title VII enforcement
action. An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees who
protest discriminatory conditions of employment. The most common forms
of retaliation include failures to promote or to give wage increases." 9
Section 1983, however, is limited in its application to performance
reviews and personnel decisions because its application requires the existence
of a property right. A faculty member who contests a personnel decision
under 1983 usually claims that the action complained of has deprived her of
property rights without process of law as required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. But, as already explained, absent some contractual arrangement,
a professor does not have a vested property right in a teaching job before
receiving tenure.360
1. Eleventh Amendment
Section 1981 and 1983 claims against institutions of higher education are
further complicated by the Eleventh Amendment, which grants states qualified

357. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
359. RAPP, supra note 3, at 604[2][h].

360. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); San Filippo v.
Bongiovarmi, 961 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1992); Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574,
576 (8th Cir. 1990); Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 416 (7th
Cir. 1988).
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immunity from suits filed by the citizens of other states3 6' and from suits
filed by its own citizens. 62
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits damage claims against state officials
acting in their official capacities. 63 It also bars federal courts from granting
relief against state officials whose conduct violates only state law.364 A state
university, as an arm of the state, is entitled to the same qualified immunity
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.365
The Eleventh Amendment cloak of immunity extends to all government
agencies, commissions, or boards which have such a close relationship with
the state that suits against such entities are, in reality, suits against the
state. 66 The individuals who comprise such agencies, commissions, and
boards, including state university educators, administrators, and board
members, are entitled to the protection of the Eleventh Amendment so long
as they are acting within their official capacities.367
Although the Eleventh Amendment often effectively insulates state
officials from lawsuits, it is not without its limitations. It does not bar a suit
to enjoin as unconstitutional a state official's action.368 This exception to
the immunity doctrine is based on the premise that an unconstitutional state
enactment is void. As a result, action purportedly authorized by such an
enactment cannot be taken in an official capacity because the underlying state
authorization for the action is a nullity. 369

361. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S.
CONST. amend XI.
362. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.

Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
363. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
364. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
365. Lewis v. Midwestern State Univ., 837 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,488
U.S. 849 (1988); Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1987); Cannon v.
Univ. of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 710 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir.
1983).
366. Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 1985); "It is not necessary
that the state be named as a party, only that the named party is, in actuality, the alter
ego of the state." Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 721 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,447
U.S. 921 (1980).
367. WILLIAM A. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 75 (1989).
368. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

369. Papasan,478 U.S. at 276.
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Damages also may be awarded when a state official is sued and held
liable in his individual capacity.37 Individual-capacity suits involve actions
"'
taken by government agents outside the scope of their official capacities.37
A good example of a lawsuit being successfully pursued under section
1983 regardless of the immunity doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment can be
found in Dube v. State University of New York.372 An assistant professor of
African studies brought suit claiming violations of both Fourteenth and First
Amendment rights when he was denied tenure as well as a promotion to
associate professor. The assistant professor claimed that the denial of
promotion resulted373from his controversial teachings that Zionism in Israel was
a form of racism.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the district court to dismiss
the assistant professor's Fourteenth Amendment claim because, as a
nontenured faculty member, he lacked a protected property interest.374 The

court, however, determined that it was not appropriate to dismiss the assistant
professor's First Amendment claim because a factual issue existed as to
whether school officials had retaliated against the assistant professor for his
controversial views by denying him tenure and a promotion.375
As to the defendant's claims of qualified immunity, the court held that
the defendant individuals were not entitled to qualified immunity under section
1983 on the assistant professor's First Amendment claim. Regardless of the
court's usual deference to academic decisions, it stated that the First
Amendment does not tolerate laws or other means of coercion or intimidation
which have a chilling effect upon the free exchange of ideas in the
37
classroom. 1

2. Eleventh Amendment and Community Colleges
A community college sued by a faculty member as to a promotion or
tenure decision is not necessarily entitled to the immunity protection of the
Eleventh Amendment, even if a four-year state-supported college or university
could successfully plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to a lawsuit under
the same factual situation. A college is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

370. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).
371. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989).

372. 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,501 U.S. 1211 (1991).
373. Id.at 588, 589.
374. Id. at 589.

375. Id. at 598.
376. Id; See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 596-98, (1970); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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immunity if it has a significant degree of autonomy from the state,3" ' a
situation common to community colleges.
A good example of a community college's inability to claim immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment can be found in Parsons v. Burns and
NWACC Board of Trustees.378 The case involved the dismissal of the
division chair of the science, mathematics, and physical education department
of Northwest Arkansas Community College. The dismissal was the result of
a conflict between the division chair, Parsons, and NWACC's president,
Bums, over Parson's political activities in which he criticized certain
379
legislature bills proposed by the Arkansas Teachers' Association (ATA).
Bums ordered Parsons to stay out of potentially controversial political
issues. Parsons then announced that he would run for the state senate.
NWACC's Board of Trustees then passed a political leave policy, placed
Parsons on leave, and removed his belongings from his office. In response,
380
Parsons held a press conference concerning his treatment by NWACC.
Although Parsons had received satisfactory evaluations, he was notified
that his contract with NWACC would not be renewed. Bums accused Parsons
of insubordination and of using school time and resources to further his
political activities. After the Board of Trustees unanimously voted not to
renew Parsons' contract, he filed suit, claiming that his First Amendment
rights of peaceful assembly and free speech had been violated. He sought
reinstatement
and damages for himself and his wife, including punitive
381
damages.
NWACC raised the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to Parsons' lawsuit.
The court held that the Eleventh Amendment is applicable only if an
educational entity is an "arm-of-the-state," a decision which must necessarily
be made on a case by case basis.382
Typically, the determination of whether a given entity is an arm-of-the-state
is made by resort to a number of factors including the following: the statelaw characterization; the degree of state control and supervision over the
entity; whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its name; the
source of funds for the entity including the ability of the entity to issue
bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf; the degree of local autonomy the
entity enjoys; whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as
opposed to statewide, problems; whether the entity has the right to hold and

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Appeal of Community College of Delaware County, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
846 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
Id. at 1374-75.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
at 1376.
Id. at 1378.
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use property; and whether the entity performs governmental or proprietary
functions. 3
The court noted that Amendment 52 to the Arkansas Constitution
invested the general assembly with authority to establish districts to furnish
community college instruction and technical training? 4 Although the
districts receive general operation funds from the state, they are empowered
to spend more funds than those provided by the state and can levy taxes to
provide for additional operation funds. 8 5
In addition, local control of each community college is vested in a local
board of nine members which has broad authority over the administration of
the college.
The local board is empowered, inter alia: (1) to select its officers; (2) to
develop, with the advice of the State Community College Board, the
educational program; (3) to appoint, with the advice of the State
Community College Board, a president and fix the compensation and terms
of office of the president who shall be the executive officer of the local
board and the college; (4) to appoint, upon nomination of the president,
members of the administrative and teaching staffs and to fix their
compensation and terms of employment; (5) to enter into contracts; (6) to
accept grants or contributions of money to be used for any of its purposes;
(7) to acquire, own, lease, use, and operate property; and (8) to exercise the
right of eminent domain.38 6
The court concluded that NWACC had taken full advantage of the
autonomy available to community colleges under Arkansas law. As a result,
it was structured more like a school district or political subdivision rather than
an arm-of-the-state and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 8 7
c. RehabilitationAct of 1973 and Americans With DisabilitiesAct
(ADA)
Protection against employment discrimination for otherwise qualified
persons with any of a broad range of physical and mental disabilities is

383. Id (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
286 (1977); Folse v. Delgado Community College, 776 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (E.D. La.
1991)).
384. Id.at 1379.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1379-80.
387. Id.at 1380.
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provided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans With
Colleges and universities are subject to the
Disabilities Act of 1990.
388
provisions of both acts.
One of the most important pieces of civil rights legislation to be enacted
in recent years is the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which was
signed by President Bush on July 26, 1990.389
The ADA protects the 43,000,000 Americans with one or more
disabilities.3 ° Under the ADA, disability means:
1. a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of an individual's major life activities;
2. a record of such impairment; or
3. being regarded as having such an impairment.391
The ADA protects not only those with obvious mobility impairments, but
also the mentally retarded and those with such hidden disabilities as epilepsy,
Even those persons with mental
cancer, heart disease, or AIDS. 392
disturbances may be protected.393
Employment discrimination is prohibited under Title I of the ADA. Title
I states the following policy goal:
(a) General rule - No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement of or
discharge...394
A covered entity includes any employer with 25 or more employees.
Since July 26, 1994, an employer means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding
calendar year...395

388. See Wayne A. Hill, Jr. Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1990: Significant
Overlap with Section 504 for Colleges and Universities, 18 J. C. & U. L. 389-417
(1992).
389. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
390. Id. § 12101(a).
391. Id. § 12102(2).
392. ADA Title I Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h) (1995), reprinted
in ADA HANDBOOK: STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND RELATED MATERIALS 17 (1995).
393. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (Supp. V 1993).

394. Id. § 12112(a).
395. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
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A qualified person with a disability is defined as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the
39 6
essential functions of the employment position.
The ADA requires employers to make a "reasonable accommodation" to
an applicant's or employee's known physical or mental limitations.
Employers must modify work environments to make existing facilities readily
accessible and usable by disabled employees.
The ADA prohibits
discrimination against disabled people in the same manner that Title VII
prohibits discrimination against other protected groups.397
To avoid discriminating against a "qualified person with a disability" an
employer must be careful to define the "essential functions" of a position. An
employer must be able to explain why any function is listed as essential. It
is suggested that an employer itemize and prioritize all duties of a particular
position and
write the job description in clear, concise, and accurate
398
language.

The federal regulations describe "essential function" as:
mhe fundamental job duties, of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires. The term399'essential functions'
does not include marginal functions of the position.
Factors which can be considered in determining whether a job function
is essential include: employer judgment, time necessary to perform a function,
work experience of current and past employees in that position, limited
number of employees available to perform the function, consequences of not
requiring a certain function, and the fact that the position exists to perform the
function. The forgoing factors are just some that can be taken into
consideration. Each case is decided on its own merits." 0 Once the
employer has defined the essential functions of a job, the employer must
design hiring and advancementprocedures which are nondiscriminatory toward
the disabled.40 '
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a "qualified person with
a disability" need only show that she was discriminated against and that a
reasonable accommodation could have been made by the employer to

396. Id.
§ 12111(8).
397. Christie Schluter, Opening Opportunities,A PersonalPerspective of ADA,

55 TEX. B. J. 827 (September 1992).
398. David L. Ryan, AmericansWith Disabilities: The LegalRevolution, 60 KAN.
B. J. 13, 15 (Nov. 1991).
399. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1995).

400. Ryan, supra note 398, at 15.
401. Ryan, supra note 398, at 16.
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accommodate the complainant's disability. "Reasonable accommodation"
includes: (1) making existing facilities readily accessible and usable to
disabled persons; (2) restructuringjobs, such as modifying work schedules; (3)
modification of equipment or devices, or even the acquisition of new
equipment or devices; (4) modification of examinations, training materials, or
policies; (5) hiring qualified readers or interpreters, and (6) similar
modifications for disabilities.4 2
To defend a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the
employer must prove that a reasonable accommodation would be an "undue
hardship." Undue hardship is determined on a case by case basis, but the
following factors may be taken into consideration: the facility's financial
resources; the number of persons employed; the overall size of the operation;
the impact of the expense on the business; and the type of business, its
structure, and its functions.4 3
The significance of the ADA to performance evaluations lies in the fact
that a candidate for employment, promotion, retention, or tenure cannot have
her disabilities taken into consideration as to job performance, at least in most
circumstances. For example, if a professor's scholarship activities are limited
by the professor being legally blind, the university would have an obligation
to make reasonable accommodations to resolve the professor's difficulties,
such as by hiring readers or furnishing research materials written in Braille.
Only after the university reasonably accommodated the professor as to her
disability, and the professor failed to meet the institution's publication
guidelines, could the institution deny promotion or tenure to the professor.
Just as importantly, in making the initial hiring decision the institution
could not make a determination that the candidate's disabilities would prevent
the candidate from meeting teaching, research, scholarship, and public service
Only if the institution could prove that a reasonable
requirements.
accommodation would constitute an undue hardship could it lawfully deny
employment to a disabled person based on the person's disabilities.
Tyndall v. National Education Centers4" is a good example of the
application of the ADA in education. Tyndall was an instructor at a business
college who suffered from lupus erythematosus, an autoimmune system
disorder that causes joint pain and inflammation, fatigue, and urinary and
intestinal disorders. The college's administration accommodated Tyndall's
medical condition by permitting her to take sick leave, to come into work late
or leave early, and to take breaks from ongoing classes whenever she felt ill.

402. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)&(B) (Supp. V 1993).
403. Id. § 12111(10)(A)&(B).
404. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
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It was not until Tyndall's work absences increased that the college's
administration terminated her employment."'
After her employment was terminated, Tyndall filed an ADA action
against the college. Tyndall contended that she was qualified for her job
because she could perform all of her teaching duties and received "good" and
"excellent" performance evaluations.4" 6
The court held, however, that Tyndall's dismissal did not violate the
ADA. Regardless of her performance evaluations, Tyndall was not a qualified
person protected by the ADA as she could not meet the job's attendance
requirements. Tyndall failed to meet her scheduled classes and spend time
with her students. In a seven-month period she missed more than forty days
of work. She also twice missed the crucial beginning of an instructional cycle
and indicated to the college she would miss a third. Tyndall's attendance
record was poor even with the college's extensive accommodation of her
medical condition.40 7
d. Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires
employers to evaluate persons age forty or older on their qualifications or
ability to competently perform their jobs, and not on their age.40 ' Like any
other employer, colleges and universities are prohibited from considering a
faculty member's age in making decisions as to employment, salary increases,
promotion, tenure, and retention. In Fisher v. Vassar College,4" for
example, Vassar College was found to have violated the ADEA and provisions
of the Equal Pay Act when it denied tenure to a female biology professor.
The senior faculty members of the biology department recommended that
Fisher be denied tenure on the grounds that she did not demonstrate "the
outstanding quality called for in the Guidelines for Appointment,
Reappointment and Promotion of Faculty at Vassar College as set forth in the
Faculty Handbook." The committee denigrated Fisher's scholarship, teaching
ability, and service.410
The evidence, however, including a review of Fisher's record by three
outside evaluators, strongly supported Fisher's contention that she should have
been granted tenure. In particular, the court noted that Vassar, while denying

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 213-14.
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
852 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Id.
at 1197.
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Fisher tenure, granted tenure to three male faculty members whose publication
records in prestigious journals were inferior to Fisher's.4'
4 12
an early retirement plan
Also, in Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago,

offered to faculty members was found to violate the ADEA. The court held
the plan to be a mere subterfuge to discriminate against older faculty.4" 3
e. Equal Pay Act
In Fisher,Vassar College was found to have violated the provisions of
the Equal Pay Act as well as the ADEA 4' The Equal Pay Act requires that
female employees receive pay comparable to male coemployees if the
employees are performing work substantially equal in skill, effort, and
responsibility under similar working conditions.4" 5
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff
must show that she received less pay than a male coemployee performing
work substantially equal in skill, effort, and responsibility under similar
working conditions." 6 The comparison must be made against a particular
male and not against some hypothetical male with a composite average of a
group's skill, effort, and responsibility. 7
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the pay differential is justified. Justification can be established by one of four
statutory exemptions: a seniority system, a merit system, a system that
measures earnings by quantity or quality, or any other differential system
based on factors other than sex.418

411. Id. at 1192, 1203, 1205.

412. 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988).
413. Id. at 320. Before 1994, the ADEA did not prohibit the compulsory
retirement of any higher education employee who had attained 70 years of age even
if the employee was tenured.

Since the end of 1993, however, such mandatory

retirements have been prohibited. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (1994).
414. Fisher, 852 F. Supp. 1193.

415. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 6(d)(1), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1994).
416. Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College Ass'n, 935 F.2d 974, 979 (8th Cir.
1991); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1984).
417. Houck v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., 10 F.3d 204, 206
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing EEOC v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 690 F.2d 1072, 1076-78 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
418. Id. at 207 (citing Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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IV. CONFIDENTIALITY

Permeating the legal challenges to the performance review process is the
question of confidentiality. How much information should be revealed to
candidates as to their reviews? In particular, are candidates entitled to know
their evaluators' identities?
A. Confidentialityin General
Some universities have voluntarily adopted a policy of openness in the
academic review process. Many universities will supply tenure candidates
with the names of evaluators as well as the text of their views." 9 The
performance review boards of many institutions, however, prefer to conduct
their business in private. The reasoning is that open and public forums chill
deliberations and inhibit the free and open exchange of opinions and
information that is necessary to the deliberative process.
Of course, those whose careers are under review often view confidential
proceedings as matters of secrecy. They suspect that the cloak of secrecy
permits their enemies and critics to conduct vendettas and affect careers with
impunity.
The issue of confidentiality is further complicated by state open meeting
laws. Many states have enacted legislation forcing certain actions and
deliberations to be conducted in public. Much litigation has occurred in recent
years over whether higher education institutions are subject to open meeting
laws, and in particular whether any or all processes of performance reviews
are subject to such laws.
A case which illustrates this conflict of openness versus privacy,
especially in light of a state open meeting law, is Donahue v. State of Iowa,
Board of Regents, and University of Iowa.42°
Donahue, an associate professor of law at the University of Iowa, was
denied promotion to full professor. She appealed her denial through the
university's departmental and college decision making process. 421'
The university operations manual set forth four procedural stages for
denial of promotion: (1) informal discussions; (2) requests for a written

419. See, e.g., Board of Auditors, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90

(1978); Megill v. Board of Regents of State of Florida, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir.
1976); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-1232 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1354 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Lewis v. Chicago
State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also AAUP Report,
Access to FacultyPersonnelFiles, 78 ACADEME 24 (July/Aug. 1992).
420. 474 N.W. 2d 537 (Iowa 1991).
421. Id at 537.
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statement of reasons; (3) investigation by and, when deemed appropriate, a
hearing before a faculty judicial panel; and (4) the president's decision.422
The plaintiff alleged that an open meeting violation occurred at the third
procedural stage of a hearing before the faculty judicial panel. The faculty
judicial panel was formed through the university's faculty senate, which was
elected by the faculty at large. Under university rules all documents used in
the investigation were deemed confidential; therefore, either party could
prevent the dissemination of documents deemed unsuitable.4 Prior to the
hearing, the plaintiff demanded that the hearing be an open one. She wanted
a local newspaper reporter to be present, as well as a member of a national
association of college educators.
The panel, however, rejected her requests on
424
confidentiality.
of
grounds
Iowa has an open meeting law. Section 21.3 of the Iowa Code provides
that the meetings of governmental bodies are to be in open session, unless
closed sessions are expressly permitted by law, and the law covers both
informal and formal sessions. Section 21.6(3)(c) of the law provides that
action taken in violation of the statute is void.4' The Iowa Code includes
in its definition of governmental bodies multi-membered bodies to which the
Board of Regents or university president has delegated management and
control.426
427
Previously, in Greene v. Athletic Council of Iowa State University,
the Iowa Supreme Court held a university athletic council subject to open
meeting laws. However, at that time, the definition of governmental bodies
referred to "authorized" governmental bodies and the court took that phrase
to mean that the law applied to any governmental body regardless of whether
the body had any policy-making power. 428 After Greene, the Iowa Code
was amended and the term authorized was deleted.429
Given the change in wording, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to apply
the open meeting law in Donahue. The court held that the faculty judicial
panel was essentially an advisory board without any policy-making power. As
such, its decisions were not binding on the Board of Regents and the judicial
panel was separated from the regents by layers of university officials.430
The court further stated that it was up to the legislature to set the parameters

422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
Id.
See IOWA CODE § 21.3(a)(b)(c)(d) (1995).
251 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Iowa 1977).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 538-39.
Id.
at 539.
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of the open meeting law and to weigh efficient administration against a
measure of confidentiality. Although the court might or might not set some
boundaries differently, it had a responsibility to apply those set by the
legislature.43'
In addition to the problem of conducting peer reviews in private, there
is the additional question of the confidentiality of the sources involved in the
process. Should those being reviewed by their peers be able to discover who
said what about them? Peer reviews consist of gathering letters of evaluation
or other statements from faculty members, especially tenured members, about
those being evaluated. If a faculty member up for promotion or tenure
receives negative evaluations, it is only natural to want to know not only the
substance but the source of the evaluation. It is also just as natural for the
party making the negative evaluation to want to remain anonymous. This
conflict of complete access to records versus confidentiality was recently
432
litigated in the case of Scharf v. Regents of the University of California.
In an action brought by six present or former members of the University of
California faculty denied tenure or promotion, the American Federation of
Teachers, and the University Council, a California court had the opportunity
to rule on these conflicting rights.
The University of California's tenure and promotion process begins with
the department chairperson notifying a potential candidate that a determination
will be made and requesting pertinent information. The chairperson solicits
letters from qualified individuals, including a reasonable number nominated
by the candidate. The solicitations include the opinions of departmental
colleagues and "distinguished extramural informants." Candidates have the
right to identify persons they contend will not objectively evaluate the
candidates' qualifications or performance. This information is preserved in
each candidate's file.433
Before a decision on tenure or promotion is made, the chairperson must
provide the candidate with an opportunity to review her file. The candidate,
however, receives only an oral or written "comprehensive summary" of the
evaluations, and the identities of the evaluators are kept private. The
confidentiality of the evaluators is maintained throughout the review process,
including the appeal of any adverse determinations. 4 t
The petitioners contended that the requirement of confidentiality deprived
them of a meaningful opportunity to respond to criticism resulting in adverse
determinations in violation of their constitutional rights to privacy and due

431. Id.

432. 286 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
433. Id. at 230.

434. Id.
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process of law.435 The university argued that confidential evaluations are
necessary to an effective review process. It contended that without
confidentiality there is a substantial likelihood that qualified evaluators would
refuse to provide evaluations. The university contended that the procedures
were fully in accord with the standards advocated by the American
Association of University Professors.436

The court sided with the university. It held that the university's need for
confidentiality, combined with the privacy rights of the evaluators, outweighed
the disclosure rights of the employees being evaluated.437

California courts have been so protective of the confidentiality of faculty
evaluators that they have even refused to permit promotion and tenure
candidates to inquire into the motives of known or suspected evaluators. In
Kahn v. Superior Court,438 a candidate denied a permanent appointment at
Stanford filed a defamation and tortious interference with an advantageous
business relationship suit against a tenured professor. The candidate, who
contended that a particular professor persuaded the department to deny tenure
on nonacademic grounds, sought to take the professor's deposition. The trial
court ordered the deposition for the sole purpose of inquiring into the
professor's statements, motives, and conduct in connection with the review
and evaluation of the candidate's application.439
The court of appeals, however, set the deposition order aside. It
concluded that, even though academic freedom could be used to shield
nonacademic and insidious motives for denying tenure, in California the
fostering of academic excellence finds support in the constitutional right to
privacy."'
B. Piercingthe Veil of Confidentiality
It is important to note that the complainant in Kahn did not make a claim
of discrimination. To pierce the veil of confidentiality, a candidate deprived
of retention, promotion, or tenure must make a claim of illegal discrimination
against the college or university and its evaluators. It is only through a
discrimination claim that full discovery can be obtained because some courts,
especially California state courts, are so enamored with the confidentiality of
the evaluation process so as to deny discovery even in those cases where the
motives for denying tenure are highly questionable.

435. Id. at 229.
436. Id. at 231.
437. Id. at 237.

438. 233 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
439. Id. at 665.

440. Id at 674.
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In discrimination cases, however, courts may require that performance
evaluations be fully disclosed to an affected person. In Stone v. University of
Maryland Medical Sys. Corp.,44 1 a state university medical professor was
able to obtain full disclosure of his peer review materials. The professor, a
surgeon at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, was the target of
malpractice actions. Following peer review committee investigations, the
professor resigned from his position at the medical school. He then filed an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the university and a number of
individuals. 2
One of the issues in the case was the discoverability of the medical
review records. The medical school and other defendants contended that
under a Maryland state statue, the records were not discoverable. 443
According to the defendants, the applicable state law preserved the
confidentiality of peer review records in order to foster effective, thorough,
frank, and uninhibited exchange among peer review committee members in
order to ensure quality patient care. 4 "
In overruling the trial court's decision to seal the records, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Maryland law in question had no
application to a civil proceeding initiated by a physician who was the subject,
or party to, the proceedings of the medical review committee." 5 In such
limited circumstances medical review committee records are not insulated
from discovery and, furthermore, the records can be admitted into evidence
in the civil action." 6
The issue of the confidentiality of peer review documents has now been
clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In University of Pennsylvania
V. EEOC,4 47 the court held that such documents are not protected by a
common-law evidentiary privilege or a First Amendment academic freedom
privilege. 448
The case involved Rosalie Tung, a Chinese-American woman, who was
hired in 1981 as an associate professor in the University of Pennsylvania's
Wharton School of Business. She was a tenure candidate during the 1984-85
academic year. Although her colleagues in the management department

441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

948 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 129.
MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601(d), (e) (1981).

Stone, 948 F.2d at 130.
Id.

Id.
493 U.S. 182 (1990).
Id. at 195-202.
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recommended her for tenure, the personnel committee refused Professor
Tung's tenure request and gave her no explanation for the denial." 9
Professor Tung subsequently learned that the committee justified its
decision by contending the school of business was not interested in Chinarelated research. Believing the committee's justification to be a pretext for
discrimination, Professor Tung filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission claiming racial and gender discrimination.45 °
To investigate Professor Tung's claim, the EEOC requested all documents
related to Professor Tung's tenure denial. The university agreed to provide
the requested documents, except for the confidential peer reviews.4 5'
The dispute between the EEOC and the university eventually reached the
United States Supreme Court.452 The university claimed that the release of
the confidential peer review material would have a chilling effect on the
tenure process. To protect the material from the EEOC's scrutiny, as well as
the scrutiny of others, the university claimed that the information contained
in the confidential peer review was protected from disclosure by 1) an
evidentiary privilege4 3 and 2) academic freedom.454

As to the university's privilege claim, the Court noted that Congress, in
enacting the 1972 amendments to Title VII, recognized discrimination within
universities to be a compelling problem. The 1972 amendments brought
tenure decisions under the same scrutiny as the decisions of employers in other
fields. As a result, the EEOC's authority to obtain any evidence relevant to
a discrimination claim applied to faculty tenure decisions.455
As to the academic freedom argument, the Court observed that previous
cases affirming academic freedom involved government attempts to directly
regulate the content of academic speech. The Court held that the EEOC was
not attempting to regulate the content of academic speech or to provide
academic hiring criteria. Rather, the EEOC was investigating whether
nonacademic criteria had been used in the hiring process. The Court
chcaracterized the university's argument that disclosure of the confidential
peer review would harm academic freedom as being "extremely attenuated"
and "speculative." ' 6

449. Id. at 185.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 186.

452. See Don Mark North, Note, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC: The
Denial ofAn Academic Freedom Privilege, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 213, 233-35 (1990), for
a complete review of the case and a discussion of procedural facts.
453. University of Pennsylvania,493 U.S. at 188-89.
454. Id. at 195.
455. Id. at 489-495.

456. Id. at 198-200; see also Peterson v. City College of the City Univ. of N. Y.,
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V. REDUCING LIABILITY EXPOSURE
Recognizing that performance evaluations are filled with legal pitfalls,

one question naturally arises: What can institutions of higher education do to
lessen their liability exposure? Fortunately, a wealth of information is
available to assist colleges and universities in devising legally acceptable
evaluation programs. The widespread use of performance evaluations in and
out of education and a long line of court decisions on the validity of numerous
performance evaluation programs have led to some well-defined principles
over the years.
As explained in this Article, faculty members being considered for salary
increases, retention, promotion, or tenure are usually judged in four broad
categories: (1) scholarship, (2) teaching, (3) service, and (4) ability to work
with others. The courts have approved the use of these traditional categories
for evaluating faculty performance. 4 7 The courts have also acknowledged
that evaluating faculty performance sometimes involves an assessment of
458
intangible qualities that cannot always be measured by objective standards.
Past leniency by the courts in reviewing so-called "academic decisions,"
however, is not a guarantor of future leniency. As the cases cited in this
Article indicate, the courts are already inclined to make a much more critical
appraisal of performance reviews, especially where claims of discrimination
and constitutional violations are raised. There is absolutely no reason to
believe that this trend of increased judicial scrutiny of traditional academic
decisions will not continue. As a result, colleges and universities must be
much more careful in developing, administering, and using performance
evaluations. In particular, they should strive for objectivity and fairness in
performance evaluations.
A. Developing a Performance Evaluation System
Good beginnings often lead to good results, and performance evaluation
systems are no different. No performance evaluation system should be
developed without adequate consultation among administrators, board
members, faculty, and legal counsel.459 In many, if not most instances,
expert assistance may be needed in designing the system. Certainly, a
complete review of the available literature on designing performance

160 F.R.D. 22, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
457. See Labat v. Board of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Green v. Board of Regents of Texas Tech Univ., 335 F. Supp 249,
350-51 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973).

458. Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (N.D.Ill. 1969).
459. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., 457 F.2d 1268, 1270-71 (8th Cir. 1972).
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evaluations should be conducted by the committee charged with the obligation
to formulate an evaluation system. This literature review must be done before
a design is attempted. The following constitutes a checklist of some other
actions to be taken before a performance evaluation system is designed or
revised:
1.

Those responsible for developing the plan are given a clear charge that

clearly defines their task.
2.

The prior knowledge and attitudes about evaluation of those affected

by the plan are determined.
3.

Those being evaluated are made aware of the value of performance

evaluation.
4. Persons representative of those being evaluated are involved in the
development of the plan.
5. Supervisory persons responsible for implementing the system are
involved in the development of the plan.
6. Development of the evaluation plan has the support and commitment
of appropriate upper administrative personnel.
7.

The evaluation plan is designed to fit the organization's current

mission and goals.
8. Clear, written position descriptions of those whose performance will
be evaluated are in writing and are well known.460
B. Clearly Stated Purposes
Clearly stated purposes constitute the most basic component of an
evaluation system.46' All elements to be included in an evaluation system
must be tailored to fit their intended purposes. 462 Clearly stated objectives
are critical to gaining acceptance of an evaluation program. 463 Also,
knowing and understanding the objectives of the evaluation program are vital
44
to determining which appraisal factors to use.
C. Criteriaand Standards
The appropriate criteria by which faculty are evaluated should be
determined and stated in writing. It is only by clearly setting out the criteria

460. James 0. Hammons, Purposes of an EvaluationSystem 9-13 (unpublished

manuscript, on file with the University of Arkansas School of Law) © James 0.
Hammons.
461. Id. at 1.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 2.
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that faculty can determine the performance expected of them and evaluators
To facilitate this, criteria should be stated as
can reliably judge performance.
65
possible.1
as
objectively
Furthermore, criteria must actually measure job responsibilities and
performance. The following checklist serves as a useful guide in developing
criteria:
1. Criteria used in the appraisal program are clearly stated in writing.
2. Evaluation criteria are specific and objective.
3. Evaluation criteria are related directly to the responsibilities of the
person being evaluated.
4. To the extent possible, evaluation criteria are based upon observable
job behaviors or measurable results.
5. Evaluation criteria do not rely solely on vague personal traits such as
commitment, initiative, and aggressiveness and do not include them at all
unless they are defined in terms of overt observable behavior.
6. Evaluation criteria include achievement of previously agreed to
objectives.
7. Criteria appraise the methods (means) employees use as well as the
results achieved.
8. Evaluation criteria are flexible enough to allow for differences in
specific responsibilities when two or more individuals perform similar jobs.
9. Adequate attention is given to both qualitative and quantitative criteria.
10. The weighting of various criteria in relation to the overall assessment
is made known to the employee at the beginning of the evaluation cycle.
The establishment of appropriate standards is just as critical to the success
of a performance evaluation system as the selection of appraisal criteria.466
Standards must be reduced to writing, provide a basis for measuring success,
and designate acceptable performance levels.467 All standards should be
objective and the same standards should be applied to all persons with
comparable responsibilities. 68
A source of frustration for faculty members facing reappointment,
promotion, and tenure decisions is the proverbial "moving target." A faculty
member labors for years under one set of criteria and standards and believes
he has met those only to find that his performance is now being measured by
a newer and more stringent set of criteria and standards. This can be
especially frustrating when the faculty member knows that other professors in
similar disciplines have been granted tenure under the old criteria and some

465.
466.
467.
468.

Id. at 7, 8.
Id. at 14, 15.
Id at 15.
Id.
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of those persons, who themselves could not meet the new criteria, now sit in
judgment on the faculty member's future with the institution.
Regardless of how unfair this "moving target" may be to the faculty
member undergoing evaluation, the courts have given colleges and universities
wide latitude in this area. For example, in Hooker v. Tufts University,469 a

Tufts female physical education instructor was denied tenure because of a lack
of scholarly activity. Previously, however, the university had waived
scholarship requirements for physical education faculty including the
university's football coach. Regardless of the appearance of unfairness, a
United States district court upheld Tufts' right to change standards.470
In a number of cases, faculty members have been denied tenure because
they lacked terminal degrees, even though the possession of a terminal degree
had not previously been a requirement for tenure. In such instances,
disappointed faculty members have filed discrimination actions against their
colleges and universities claiming denial of equal protection, arbitrary and
capricious conduct by their institutions, and due process violations under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In each
instance, the courts have denied the complaints and have upheld the right of
institutions of higher education to modify and heighten their standards for
promotion and tenure, even as to those faculty members who began their
employment under lesser standards.47'
D.

Use of Evaluators

Evaluators, or raters, are those persons responsible for conducting the
evaluations. Administrators should not simply assume that almost anyone can
serve as a competent evaluator. Nor should administrators give any person the
responsibility of evaluating another's job performance without adequate
training and preparation. The following suggestions on evaluators were made
by an expert witness during a discrimination trial concerning a number of
black teachers who were denied reappointment. Although the trial took place
in 1975, the suggestions are even more relevant today:
1.

Each evaluator should be trained in personnel evaluation generally and

specifically in the use of the particular evaluative instrument.

469. 581 F. Supp. 104 (D. Mass. 1983).
470. Id. at 114-16.
471. Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 639-41 (4th Cir. 1979); Lewandoski v.
Vermont State Colleges, 457 A.2d 1384 (Vt. 1983); Fairchild v. Vermont State

Colleges, 449 A.2d 932, 1134-35 (Vt. 1982); see also Barbara A. Lee, Raising The
Hurdles: JudicialReaction To HeightenedStandardsForPromotion and Tenure, 20
EDUC. L. REP. 357 (1985).
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2. Several of these trained evaluators should be employed for each
criteria or characteristic.
There should be several evaluations with respect to each characteristic
3.
over a continuum of time.
4. The several evaluators should reach and record their conclusions
independently.
5. All evaluating should be based on first-hand observations of that
which is being evaluated.
without delay along with
6. All evaluations should be recorded
472
supporting evidence to justify the results.
E. Documentation
Documentation should provide an audit trail that adequately reconstructs
the basis for any personnel decisions that are made. 473 The following factors
should govern the documentation of any employee's personnel file as to
performance evaluations:
1. Sufficient evidence is systematically obtained to adequately assess
performance.
2. Unnecessary and unused data are not required to be fumished.
3. Data are required from a variety of independent sources each of whom
is in a position to make a valid evaluation.
4. Data are collected and scored under standardized conditions.
5. Procedures spell out the responsibilities of both supervisors and those
being evaluated in assembling necessary documentation.
6. Data are obtained only from those persons who have frequent
opportunities to evaluate the employee's performance.
474
7. Data required includes self-evaluation by the employee.

F. Informing the Employee
A formal written report must be prepared for each faculty member
evaluated. The report should contain a summary of the faculty member's
strengths, weaknesses, and suggestions for correction along with a time frame
for taking corrective measures. 47 It is extremely important that faculty
members be given specific and valid reasons as to any adverse

472. Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 754-55 (S.D. Tex.
1975), modified, 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 966 (1977).
473. Mark R. Edwards and J. Ruth Sproull, SafeguardingYour Employee Rating
System, 18 Bus. 21 (Apr-June 1987).
474. Id.
475. Hammons, supra note 460.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/1

90

1996]

Copeland and Murry: Copeland: Getting Tossed from the Ivory Tower:
EVALUATING FACULTY PERFORMA4NCE

recommendations concerning promotion and tenure. The results of a
performance evaluation should be given to a faculty member within a
reasonable amount of time and before any final action is taken as to retention,
pay increases, promotion, or tenure.
All faculty members should be required to sign their report, indicating
that they have seen the document. The signature should not constitute an
approval of, or agreement to, the findings in the report.476. Also, prior to
final decisions being made, faculty members should be given the opportunity
to file a written response to the findings in the report as to accuracy,
relevance, and completeness.477
Faculty members should be given appraisal interviews. The interviews
should be conducted by supervisors with specific training in conducting such
interviews. These interviews may focus on either developmental needs to
avoid problems or judgmental decisions. However, evaluators should not
attempt to accomplish both purposes in one interview. An appraisal interview
should not be a monologue. Faculty members should be given an opportunity
to verbally express their opinion as to the evaluation.
Of paramount concern in the entire process is the protection of the faculty
member's privacy. If a report contains erroneous material, the dissemination
of that material to the public, either directly or indirectly, could expose
university personnel to libel and slander lawsuits. Regardless of the accuracy
or truthfulness of the information, the dissemination of such information
beyond those who have a "need to know" can result in invasion of privacy
lawsuits.47
G. Additional Considerationsin Performance Evaluations
Besides following the suggestions already set out in this Article, there are
some additional considerations about which administrators and faculty
members need to be aware in developing and using performance evaluations.
1. Contaminated or Deficient Appraisals
Performance evaluations should be job relevant and should accurately
account for the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of the faculty member's job.
An appraisal addressing factors outside a faculty member's job description is
said to be contaminated.479 Examples of contamination include such factors

476. Hammons, supra note 460.
477. Seldin, supra note 43, at 4.
478. See Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E. 2d 126 (1984).
479. LEAP, supra note 13, at 176.
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as a faculty member's lifestyle, religious practices, or other non-job-related
conduct.48
Conversely, an appraisal should take into account all aspects of a faculty
member's job performance. Failure to do so results in a deficient appraisal.
It can be argued that an evaluation which fails to give credit to a faculty
member's481service, while listing it as a category of evaluation, is per se
deficient.
2. Halo Effect
An inappropriate halo effect may occur where one aspect of a faculty
member's evaluation dominates her other job performance aspects. For
example, the winning of a prestigious research award may result in a favorable
evaluation for a faculty member who is an inept teacher or who neglects
service.412
3. Recency Effect
The recency effect can cause evaluators to overlook an otherwise
inadequate academic career and grant advancement to an undeserving faculty
member. The recency effect occurs when evaluators are swayed by a flurry
of academic achievement just prior to an evaluation causing them to overlook
the faculty member's overall lack of achievement.483
4. Past Record Anchoring
While a faculty member's most recent accomplishments should not
obscure an overall lackluster record, neither should a faculty member's past
record of achievement, or lack of achievement, distort a current performance
evaluation. A faculty member's overall productivity, including recent
accomplishments or lack of accomplishments, should be evaluated.484
H. ProceduralDue Process
Finally, the entire process must afford the faculty member with
procedural due process. Some procedural due process is inherent in the
already suggested procedures for preparing judgmental criteria, the method of
480. LEAP, supra note 13, at 176.
481. LEAP,
482. LEAP,
483. LEAP,
484. LEAP,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

13,
13,
13,
13,

at 177.
at 177.
at 177.
at 177.
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evaluating job performance, documenting the decision-making process, and
informing the faculty member of the recommendation. But, procedural due
process is not complete without a formal appeal system. A performance
evaluation system that does not afford a faculty member at least one level of
appeal for an objective review of adverse decisions is deficient and subject to
legal attack.
An effective appeal procedure contains the following:
1. Faculty Acceptance
The appeal process must be known by and accepted by faculty. An
appeal procedure must not be a real or perceived rubber stamp for the
decisions of department heads, deans, or other administrators. The objectivity
of the appeal process is extremely important if a wrongful discharge or
employment discrimination485case reaches the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or the courts.
2. Simplicity
The appeal procedure must be simple and easy to use. The effectiveness
of an appeal procedure can be diminished by complex procedures, excessive
paperwork, unnecessary delays in the system, and other mechanisms which
discourage use of the system.486
3. Fair Hearing
A good appeal procedure provides both sides with a fair hearing. Faculty
and institutional representatives should have adequate time to fully develop
their cases, including ample time for fact finding, presentation of evidence and
arguments, and an opportunity for rebuttal of each side's contentions.487
Naturally, the entire process must be free488 of internal bias and external
pressures to achieve a predetermined result.
4. Power of Appeal Committee Clearly Delineated
The appeal procedure must clearly delineate the power of the appeal
committee. Will the committee have the authority to pass judgment over
reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions and overrule those decisions
485. LEAP, supra note 13, at 177.

486. LEAP, supra note 13, at 179-80.
487. LEAP, supra note 13, at 180.
488. LEAP, supra note 13, at 180.
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believed to have been erroneously made, or will it merely make
recommendations to college and university officials about the proper course
of action?. 9 An appeal committee which merely makes recommendations
that officials are free to accept or ignore may do little to resolve personnel
decisions and may actually increase faculty frustration if the committee's
recommendations are often ignored. Of course, the process whereby appeal
committee members are appointed or elected becomes extremely important if
the appeal committee has the power to make final decisions.
5. Exhaustion of Remedies
The appeal procedure should specify when faculty members are required
to exhaust the internal appeals procedure before pursuing litigation in a state
or federal agency or court. In some states, state law may make this
determination.49
Under the principle of comity, courts will usually require a complainant
to exhaust all administrative remedies before applying to a court for relief.
However, a court is not required to defer to administrative proceedings and
may accept a case if the court feels that the available remedies are
inadequate.49'
SUMMARY
Courts still retain a certain reluctance to review college and university
personnel decisions. This is especially true as to nontenured faculty members
who are treated as at-will employees serving at an institution's discretion,
absent some special circumstance such as a faculty policy manual establishing
a de facto property right in a teaching position. But, as a general rule,
nontenured faculty members are not entitled to procedural or substantive due
process when retention, promotion, and compensation decisions are made.
Institutional decisions regarding nontenured faculty are reviewed by the courts
under a very lenient standard. A court will disturb a personnel decision only

489. LEAP, supra note 13, at 180.
490. LEAP, supra note 13, at 180; see also Ashley v. Univ. of Louisville, 723
S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (nontenured professor's suit over being denied
tenure was dismissed as premature because professor failed to first exhaust
administrative remedies).
491. McDowell v. Napolitano, 895 P. 2d 218, 222-23 (N.M. 1995); see also,
Pritchett v. Marshall, 375 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (courts will intervene
without requiring an exhaustion of administrative remedies where there is a claim that
constitutional rights are being violated).
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if the decision-making body acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner or
abused its discretion.
Tenured faculty members, however, must be afforded both procedural and
substantive due process when those same personnel decisions are made about
them because tenured faculty members have a vested property right.
Procedural due process requires that, before a tenured faculty member's vested
property interest in her job be negatively impacted, the faculty member must
be provided a hearing before an impartial decision maker after an adequate
notice of charges and an opportunity to prepare a defense.
Substantive due process demands that actions affecting the rights of
tenured faculty members be supported by "just cause." This is especially true
as to a decision to terminate a tenured member's employment. "Just cause"
normally involves questions concerning a faculty member's competence,
relationships with students and colleagues, morality, and honesty. Judicial
intervention is always appropriate when an adverse employment decision about
a tenured faculty member cannot be supported by "just cause."
But regardless of whether a faculty member is tenured, judicial
intervention can be expected when important personnel decisions are made in
violation of a teacher's right to free speech as protected by the First
Amendment. The courts will also intervene when faculty decisions are made
on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability status, or other
factors protected by federal or state law.
Colleges and universities are not required by law to make intelligent
personnel decisions, any more than a business is required to do so.
Sometimes institutional decisions are well-reasoned, reward meritorious
performance, and reflect institutional needs. But institutions also at times
make ridiculous, short-sighted decisions, almost totally lacking in careful
reasoning and judgment. Colleges and universities are free to make bad
personnel decisions, but they are not free to make illegal personnel decisions
which violate the constitutional and statutory rights of their faculty.
Hopefully, by instituting sound performance evaluation systems, colleges
and universities will make personnel decisions as to both nontenured and
tenured faculty members that are both wise and legal. 9

492. LEAP, supra note 13, at 7.
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